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The New Jersey Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurefl (Mount Laurel 
II) is a remarkable instance of judicial policymaking and a veritable lodestone 
of general and specific policy prescriptions for municipal governments, 
developers, and trial courts., The ruling initiates several structural changes in 
the horizontal relationships between the judicial, executive and legislative bran-
ches of state government, as well as in the vertical relationships between state 
and local governments. Some of these changes are starkly political in nature. 
Mount Laurel// also establishes an elaborate matrix of priorities between com-
peting social and economic concerns in New Jersey. 
Invoking the state constitution's requirements of fundamental fairness, 
substantive due process and equal protection and the state's inherent police 
powers to control the use of land for the general welfare/ the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II actively initiated far~ranging changes in 
numerous areas of the law including land use planning, appellate procedure, 
remedies, evidence, local government and administrative law. Indeed, Mount 
Laurel// is a quintessential example of what Professors Porter and Tarr have 
l. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mount Laurel 11]. 
2. Tbe New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the constitutional basis for the Mount 
Laurel doctrine as follows: 
The constitutional basis for the Mount Laurel doctrine remains the same. 
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to 
legislation, is but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exer-
cised for the general welfare. When the exercise of that power by a municipality 
affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes 
more than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes 
the general welfare in this case the housing needs of those residing out-
side of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing 
demand within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that conflict 
with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power and are unconstitu ... 
tional. In particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite 
opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low and moderate income 
housing conflict with the general welfare and violate the state constitutional 
requirements of substantive due process and equal protection. Mount Laurel 
/, 67 N.J. at 17 4 and 181. 
Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415. See also NEw JERSEY STATE 
BAR AssoCIATION, LAND UsE LAW SECTION, MoUNT LAUREL II I (Aug. 1983), reprinted 
in 112 N.J.L.J. 393 (Oct. 13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as STATE BAR MouNT LAUREL 
II REPORT]. 
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termed innovative policymaking3 the most potent form of state supreme 
court policymaking. 4 
Government by judiciary necessarily causes many consequences and costs 
throughout the policy landscape. Not only are the immediate Mount Laurel 
II litigants the numerous municipalities, assorted developers and public 
interest groups involved in the consolidated review affected by the deci-
sion, but a number of non-parties are also directly touched by the ruling. This 
is a result of the supreme court's statewide regional model of inclusionary 
zoning. 5 Less obvious but equally important are what Donald Horowitz has 
termed second-order consequences of judicial forays into social policymaking. 6 
3. See STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM XVi-xvii 
(M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE SUPREME CouRTs]. Accord-
ing to this typology: 
/d. 
Although in some sense all [state supreme court] policymaking entails innova-
tion, as used here innovative policymaking refers to policymaking (a) that 
either overturns an existing state policy or fills a gap in state policy; (b) in 
which the initiative comes from within the state supreme court, rather than 
being mandated by either federal authorities or other branches of state govern-
ment; and (c) that imposes specific policies. Most frequently [state] constitu-
tional interpretation supplies the basis for such policymaking. 
4. /d. Professors Tarr and Porter categorize five major types of state supreme 
court policymaking other than innovative policymaking. The other types of policymaking 
are the following: agenda-setting policymaking (forcing political authorities to find 
alternative means of pursuing policy objectives); complementary policymaking (rulings 
that either aid state legislative goals or relieve state legislators of the onus of taking 
politically awkward stands); elaborative policymaking (extension of precedent enun-
ciated by the United States Supreme Court by state supreme courts); restrictive 
policymaking (limitation and/or evasion of policies developed by the United States 
Supreme Court); and institutional policymaking (Judicial activity directed toward preserv-
ing the autonomy and integrity of courts and the judici~l process). /d. at xvii-xviii. 
5. In addition to the municipal litigants, developers, and public interest groups 
before the court in Mount Laurel II, virtually every municipality in the state as well 
as any developer interested in constructing new buildings anywhere in the state will 
be affected by the decision. Moreover, public interest groups and non-profit organiza-
tions that view any municipal activity as impeding the goals and purposes of Mount 
Laurel II have standing to challenge the municipality in future litigation. See, e.g., 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1984, at AI, col. 1. 
6. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 292 (1977) (hereinafter cited 
as CouRTS AND SociAL PoLICY]. This concept originated in a previous study that dealt 
with second-order consequences. R. BAUER, SECOND-ORDER CoNSEQUENCES: A 
METHODOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY (1969). 
Horowitz notes that: 
Costs may show up only much later and in more far-flung forums than benefits. 
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These second-order consequences are particularly troublesome because they 
involve unanticipated social costs, which may surface much later and in dif-· 
ferent forums than benefits of the decision~ 1 
This Article focuses on the second-order consequences, unforeseen by the 
judiciary, that will result from Mount Laurel II. These consequences will be 
accompanied by social costs in such diverse policy areas as educational finance, 
local government autonomy and patterns of energy development and use within 
the state. The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it is to explain why 
Mount Laurel// presents the prospect for such perplexing and far~ flung second-
order conse-quences. Second, it is to explore in detail one disturbing example 
of the decision's unforeseen consequences: the prospect that development of 
a promising source of alternative energy solar space and water heating in 
buildings will be stifled at the local level without a corresponding mandate 
at the state level, resulting in continued and aggravated dependence on elec-
tricity, fossil fuels and other non-renewable sources of energy for the long-
term future. 8 
In its first section, the Article discusses the basic holdings and policy man-
dates of the Mount Laurel II decision. Cj In its second section, the Article defines 
the concepts of second-order consequences and postulates likely zoning and 
land use second-order consequences of the case. 10 The Article focuses on the 
specific area of solar energy development in New Jersey in its third section. • 1 
Particular concern is given to the implications of Mount Laurel II on municipal 
willingness to encourage, through appropriate land use regulations, solar energy 
use in residential and commercial structures. In the next section, the Article 
provides a further inventory of possible second-order consequences of.the 
Mount Laurel II ruling, viewed from a political as well as a socio-economic 
perspective. 12 Finally, the Article concludes with some pragmatic proposals 
for minimizing second-order consequences when state supreme courts engage 
in innovative policymaking. 13 
Put differently, costs may be more widely shared than benefits, and they are 
certainly less easily verifiable than at least the_ intended benefits are, since 
they are typically unintended and therefore not targeted for inclusion in reports 
and other monitoring efforts. 
COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLICY, at 293. 
7. D. HoROWITZ, supra note 6, at 293. 
8. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 14-74 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 75-112 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 113-200 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 201-50 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 251-63 and accompanying text. 
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I. Mount Laurel: HoLDINGS AND PoLICY MANDATES 
A. Judicial Motivations for the Decision 
Mount Laurel II was a decade in the making. 14 This single fact explains' 
much about the decision: over time, the New Jersey Supreme Court witnessed 
its promising constitutional seed emerge as a stunted sapling. Rather than 
uproot its doctrine and start from scratch a course some commentators 
predicted would occur 15 the court, in a surprising move, performed radical 
surgery, transplanting its transmogrified doctrine to richer soil. 
The court was frustrated by the lack of implementation of the constitu-
tional doctrine it first articulated in Southern Burlington Count)' NAACP v. 
Township of Mount Laure/16 (Mount Laurel!) from its inception in 1975. 
That seminal case held in broad and undefined terms that a developing 
municipality violates the state's constitutional mandate to exercise zoning 
powers for the general welfare when it fails to affirmatively afford "a realistic 
opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the present and prospec-
tive regional need for low- and moderate-income housing.''~ 7 Notwithstanding 
that a considerable cause of Mount Laurel rs implementational difficulties 
were of the court's own making, the supreme court in Mount Laurel II, while 
implicitly acknowledging the deficiencies of its past decisions, down played the 
14. The trial court initially invalidated Mount Laurel Township's zoning ordinance 
in 1973, 10 years before the supreme court's decision in Mount Laurel II. Mount 
Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 198, 456 A.2d at 410. 
For general historical background of the New Jersey Supreme Court's articula-
tion and development of the doctrine of inclusionary zoning, see D. MosKOWITZ, 
EXCLUSIONARY ZoNING LITIGATION 225-69 (1977). for more recent pre-Mount Laurel 
II developments, see D. ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLAN~ING LAw 177-88 (1981)~ 
Judicial development of exclusionary zoning principles in other states and in 
the federal courts is discussed in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING IN THE SEVEN-
TJES 235-46 (R. Freilicht & E. Stuhler eds. 1981); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND 
EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE 79-106 (1981); M. MANN, THE RIGHT To Hous-
ING: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND REMEDIES IN EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 53-103 (1976). 
15. 1981 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK§ 2.02(4] (F. Strom ed.). The 
Handbook notes: 
/d. 
[S]ome observers are predicting that, given the substantial change in the courCs 
composition since 1975 (only three of the original seven justices remain) and 
the substantial problems which have been encountered in administering the 
Mount Laurel mandates, the court may use this occasion to abandon or 
substantially alter its original position on exclusionary zoning. 
16. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount 
Laurel!), modified and enforced, 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (Law Div. 1978), 
rev'd in part and remanded, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II). 
17 ~ Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413 (citing Mount Laurel /, 
67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724). 
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significance of doctrinal confusion. Instead, the court placed the primary blame 
for the failure to get lower-income housing built on what it perceived to be 
the proximate cause of the lack of progress: municipal resistance and abuse 
of the legal process. 18 Mount Laurel Township itself triggered palpable anger 
on the part of the court. In the first paragraph of its decision, the court stated: 
The (Mount Laurel I] doctrine has become famous. The Mount Laurel 
case itself threatens to become infamous. After all this time, ten years 
after the trial court's initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, 
Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary 
ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, 
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's deter-
mination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe 
that there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional man-
date of our original opinion in this case. 19 
This opening statement set the tone for what was to follow. 
Another motivation for the scope, detail and potency of Mount Laurel 
II was the New Jersey Supreme Court's perception of unjustified failure by 
the legislature and appropriate state administrative agencies to enforce the man-
date of Mount Laurel I. The court was clearly disappointed by the unwill-
ingness of the more political branches of state government to give quantifiable 
substance to judicial concepts of "region" and "fair share" in order to foster 
actual construction of low- and moderate-income housing in municipalities 
throughout the state. 20 
The court's implicit recognition of doctrinal confusion, anger at perceived 
municipal evasiveness, and impatience with inaction by coordinate branches 
of government was joined with a general ·concern for its own judicial 
legitimacy. 21 This last concern had two distinct dimensions: first, a defensive 
resolve that court orders be obeyed by responsible officials, and second, a 
positive vision of the court as an essential formulator of major state policy 
initiatives. Indeed, the latter aspect of the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
weltanschauung had considerably matured and enlarged over the eight years 
between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II .. 22 Taken together, these judicial 
18. /d. at 198-202, 456 A.2d at 409-11. 
19. /d. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410. 
20. See id. at 212-13, 456 A.2d at 417. 
21. See id. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456. 
22. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been a leader of what might be termed 
"a unique judicial culture" since the time that Arthur Vanderbilt became Chief Justice 
of the court in 1947. See generally STATE SUPREME CoURTs, supra note 3, at 4. However, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court considerably enlarged upon this tradition by handing 
down a number of landmark policymaking decisions during the last eight years. Examples 
of these decisions include In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (in an opinion 
recognizing a wide-ranging right of privacy, the supreme court authorized withdrawal 
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motivations created an irresistible force which resulted in a truly unique and 
momentous decision. 23 
B.. Essential Mandates 
In order to understand fully the second-order consequences of Mount 
Laurel II, the fundamental holdings of the decision must first be surveyed. 
Each of the seven major holdings of Mount L,aurel II will be discussed in 
this section of the Article. More specific and less obvious principles of the 
decision are addressed in Sections III and IV of the Article. 
1., Suspension of ''Developing Municipality''' 
Benchmark and Replacement by State 
Development Guide Plan ''Growth Areas'' 
The most significant result of the Mount Laurel II decision is the elimina-
tion, for the foreseeable future, 24 of the six-part Mount Laurel/ ''developing 
of the life support system of a comatose young woman without civil or criminal liability 
on the part of any participant in the process); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 
A.2d 66 (1975) (court rejected the United States Supreme Court's more restrictive stan-
dard and held that the waiver standard under the search and seizure provision of the 
state constitution applied to consent searches, thus placing the burden on the state 
to demonstrate knowledge of a right to refuse consent); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 
496, 341 A.2d 629 (1.975) (court fashioned limited-use immunity respecting the use 
of prisoner's statements in prison disciplinary proceedings in subsequent criminal 
prosecutions based on extraconstitutional considerations of fairness and rightness); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975) (after three years and five 
intervening rulings coupled with endless legislative, executive and judicial negotiations, 
the supreme court made a final last-ditch response to legislative, intransigence by enjoining 
the expenditure of school funds until the legislature enacted the state's first income 
tax law), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1976); and State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 
A.id 257 (1975) (through the exercise of "broad administrative and procedural powers 
vested" in the court, the New Jersey Supreme Court made an exhaustive reassessment 
of the prohibition against double jeopardy requiring compulsory joinder of offenses 
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode). 
23. Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a unanimous court, commented on the 
six consolidated cases that made up Mount Laurel II and noted: 
[These cases] demonstrate the need to put some steel in [the Mount Laurel] 
doctrine. The deficiencies in its application range from uncertainty and 
inconsistency at the trial level to inflexible review criteria at the appellate level. 
The waste of judicial energy involved at every level is substantial and is matched 
only by the often needless expenditure of talent on the part of lawyers and 
experts. The length and complexity of trials is often outrageous, and the expense 
of litigation is so high that a real question develops whether a municipality 
can afford to defend or the plaintiffs can afford to sue. 
Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410-11 (emphasis provided; footnotes 
omitted). 
24. The court indicated that while it was replacing the Mount Laurel I test with 
• 
• 
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municipality" test25 for determining which municipalities are subject to inclu-
sionary zoning responsibilities for low- and moderate-income housing. 26 Under 
Mount Laurel II the obligation extends, instead, to every municipality in which 
is located an area designated as a ''growth area'' under the State Develop-
the use of the SDGP to determine a municipality's constitutional obligation, if the 
state takes action causing the use of the SDGP to become inappropriate for Mount 
Laurel purposes, the trial court must ''revert to the prior 'developing' tests to deter-
mine whether the Mount L,aurel obligation applies." /d. at 248 n.21, 456 A.2d at 435 
n.21. These tests, however, would be modified under Mount Laurel II as follows: 
developed municipalities, including the central cities and built-up suburbs, will be sub-
ject to the Mount Laurel obligation. !d. The court noted that 
• 
[t]he most significant question in such cases will ordinarily be whether there 
is any land available for development, and, if not, what kind of remedy is 
appropriate to assure that as land becomes available, a realistic opportunity 
exists for the construction of lower income housing, assuming it is otherwise 
suitable for that purpose. 
!d. The court also subjected "developing, municipalities to the Mount Laurel obliga-
tion and disavowed that ''the so-called six criteria must be satisfied to characterize 
a municipality as developing.'' The court noted that '' Ia]ny combination of factors 
demonstrating that the municipality is in the process of significant commercial, industrial 
or residential growth or is encouraging such growth, or is in the path of inevitable 
future commercial, industrial or residential growth will suffice." !d. (emphasis in 
original). 
25. The six criteria of a "developing municipality" require that the municipality: 
(1) [have] a sizeable land area, (2) [lie] outside the central cities and the older 
built-up suburbs, (3) {have] substantially shed rural characteristics, (4) [have] 
undergone great population increases since World War II or is now in the 
process of doing so, (5) not [be] completely developed, and (6) [be] in the 
path of inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and 
growth. 
/d. at 223-24, 456 A.2d at 422 (quoting Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 
164 N.J. Super. 563, 567-68, 397 A.2d 384, 386 (Law Div. 1978)). 
26. The terms "low" and "moderate" income housing had not been defined 
by the supreme court prior to Mount Laurel II. In Mount Laurel II, the court borrowed 
from the definition contained in the Federal Section 8 Housing Program as follows: 
''Moderate income families'' are those whose incomes are no greater than 
80 percent and no less that 50 percent of the median income of the area, 
with adjustments for smaller and larger families. "Lower income families" 
are those whose incomes do not exceed 50 percent of the median income of 
the area, with adjustments for smaller and larger families. See, 42 U.S. C. 
§1437a(b)(2) (1982 Supp.), in which these definitions are used to define income 
standards for the Section 8 housing subsidy program. Our phraseology dif-
fers from that in the Section 8 program, which defines "lower income families" 
as analogous to our moderate-income families, and "very low income families" 
as analogous to our "low income." 42 U.S.C. §1437a(b)(2)(1982 Supp.). 
92 N.J. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8. "Area," for purposes of the Mount Laurel 
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ment Guide Plan (SDGP), promulgated by the New Jersey Department of 
Community Affairs .. 27 The Mount Laurel obligation does not extend to 
municipalities which contain only areas designated by the SDGP as non-growth 
areas. Non-growth area designations include ''o_pen spaces, rural areas, prime 
farmland, conservation areas, limited growth areas, parts of the Pinelands 
and certain Coastal Zone areas. " 28 As a result of these designations the obliga-
tion of Mount Laurel II applies to New Jersey's central cities and developed 
suburbs. 29 Those who seek to escape the consequences of the SDGP designa-
tion bear a heavy burden. 30 
2.. Universal Obligation of All Municipalities 
to Provide Realistic Opportunity for Resident Poor 
Notwithstanding the court's approach of limiting responsibility for pre-
sent and future regional housing needs of lower-income persons to SDGP 
"growth areas," the court took an expansive view of municipal responsibility 
for providing housing for indigenous poor. 31 Each of New Jersey's 567 
municipalities now must provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing 
of its indigenous poor. There is an exception, however, where the poor repre-
sent a disproportionately large segment of the municipal population as com-
doctrine calculation of moderate-income families and low-income families, is defined 
by the court as a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). See id. Thus, ~ccord:­
ing to the court, ''A_t any particular time, an interested municipality, developer or 
judge can find out what (the constantly changing] low and moderate income levels 
are in the area . . . by asking the regional office of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development in either Camden or Newark." !d. Since there are presently two 
SMSA' s in New Jersey and the median income is historically higher in the New York 
SMSA, as a general rule more expensive low- and moderate-income housing will be 
built in the north than in the south resulting in northern growth area municipalities 
paying a higher subsidy for lower-income housing than their counterparts in the southern 
part of the state. 
The supreme court deems housing to be affordable for lower-income families 
when a "family pays no more than 25 percent of its income for such housing," not-
withstanding the court's recognition that the federal government in 1981 adjusted its 
calculations for the maximum amount of rent supplements payable to low-income 
tenants. !d. The federal government now estimates that no more than 30o/o of a tenant's 
income should be paid for housing pursuant to 12 U .S.C. § 1701s(d) (1982). /d. 
The lower-income regional housing need, according to Mount Laurel II, is made 
up of both low- and moderate-income housing according to the above definitions. The 
court found that a municipality's fair share should include both in such proportion 
as reflects all relevant factors, including the proportion of lo\v- and moderate-income 
housing that make up the regional need. !d. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419. 
27. 92 N.J. at 215, 223-48, 456 A.2d at 418, 422-36. 
28. /d. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418. 
29. See supra note 24. 
30. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418. 
31. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418. "Indigenous poor" is defined by the court 
as a municipality's resident poor who occupy dilapidated housing. Id. at 214, 456 A.2d 
at 418. 
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pared with the rest of the region. 32 The exception to this universal municipal 
responsibility would apply to most of the state's urban areas, which currently 
house substantial percentages of poor people. 
3.. Elimination of the Good Faith Standard 
for Judging Municipal Compliance 
Under Mount Laurel I and its progeny, a municipality could defend an 
exclusionary zoning attack by showing a good faith effort to comply. 33 Mount 
Laurel II rejects this "numberless approach" in future litigation. Now, in the 
typical case, a plaintiff's proofs will involve evidence of a municipality's fair 
regional share of low- and moderate-income housing on an immediate 
basis, as well as in the medium-range future. 34 ln atypical situations, plain-
tiffs will be able to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional exclusionary 
zoning by proving that the pertinent municipal ordinance is "substantially 
affected by restrictive devices." 35 In such a case, the plaintiff's proof creates 
a presumption that the ordinance is invalid. To overcome this presumption 
the local government must show quantitative compliance with its regional fair 
share obligation. 36 
4. Calculations of Regional Fair Share are Binding 
on Parties and Presumptively Valid for Non-Parties 
A limited number of specialized Mount Laurel judges, designated by the 
Chief Justice, will decide exclusionary zoning litigation arising under Mount 
Laurel II. 37 Determinations of region and regional housing need will be binding 
on all municipalities party to such lawsuits., These judicial determjnations will 
also have presumptive validity for non-party municipalities. 38 
5. Municipal Responsibilities in Meeting 
the Mount Laurel Obligation 
A municipality subject to a Mount Laurel II obligation has a panoply 
of interconnected hierarchical responsibilities. These responsibilities start-
ing with the most basic are discussed here in turn. 
First, all municipalities subject to the Mount Laurel obligation must 
32. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418. 
33. See id. at 220, 456 A.2d at 421. 
34. /d. at 215-16, 220-22~ 456 A.2d at 418-19, 420-21. See generally G. STERNLIEB 
& R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED 
(1973). 
35. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 216-17, 456 A.2d at 419. 
38. /d. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419. 
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eliminate unnecessary cost-producing requirements39 by removing zoning and 
subdivision restrictions and exactions that are not necessary to protect health 
and safety. 40 
Second, unless removal of restrictive barriers will provide a realistic 
opportunity for the construction of the municipality's fair share of the region's 
lower-income housing need, affirmative measures are required. 41 These measures 
include, but are not limited to the following: (a) municipal cooperation with 
developers' attempts to obtain state and federal housing subsidies;42 (b) provi-
sion of lower-income housing through a local housing agency; 43 (c) employ-
ment of "inclusionary devices" such as (i) lower-income density bonuses for 
developers (i.e., incentive zoning that increases the permitted density as the 
amount of lower-income housing provided is increased)44 and (ii) mandatory 
set-asides45 accompanied by continued municipal regulation of resale so that 
the designated housing units will continue to be occupied by lower-income 
persons, 46 and municipal supervision of the phase-in of lower-income units 
as the development progresses; 47 (d) zoning substantial areas for low cost mobile 
homes and other types of low cost housing; 48 (e) establishing maximum square 
footage zones; 49 and (f) "overzoning" for lower-income housing. 50 
39. I d. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419. 
40. /d. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441. 
41. /d. at 261, 456 A.2d at 443 .. 
42. /d. at 262, 456 A.2d at 443. This responsibility potentially would create 
additional responsibilities on the part of a municipality such as enactment of a "resolu-
tion of need" stating that "there is a need for moderate-income housing" in the 
municipality, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14J-6(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985), and granting 
of tax abatements to developers to comport with state or federal regulations, see, e.g., 
42 U .S.C. 1437f (Supp. 1982) (section 8 federal low- and moderate-income housing 
programs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:141-S(f). 
43. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 263, 456 A.2d at 444. While the New Jersey 
Supreme Court indicates that creation of a housing authority is not a requirement 
for municipal satisfaction of its Mount Laurel obligation, id. at 264, 456 A.2d at 444, 
the clear implication of the court's decision is that such a step by a municipality would 
go far toward meeting the affirmative action requirements and may, indeed, be required. 
See generally id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451 (all affirmative measures possible are required 
before least cost housing is acceptable in meeting a municipality's Mount Laurel 
obligation). 
44. /d. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445. 
45. /d. at 267-70, 456 A.2d at 446. 
46. /d. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. at 274-77, 456 A.2d at 450-51. 
49. /d. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447. Maximum square footage zones are defined 
by the court as ''zones where developers cannot build units with more than a certain 
footage or build anything other than lower income housing or housing that includes 
a ·specified portion of lower income housing." !d. (emphasis in original). 
50. !d. "Overzoning" is defined by the court as "zoning to allow for more than 
the fair share [of a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation] if it is likely, as it usually 
is, that not all of the property made available for lower income housing will actually 
result in [the construction] of such housing.,, !d. (emphasis in original) . 
• 
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Third, assuming that all restrictions and exactions have been removed from 
the zoning ordinance and all affirmative measures have been attempted, then 
a municipality may satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation by merely "supplement-
ing whatever lower income housing can be built with [providing realistic 
opportunity for the construction of] enough 'least cost' housing to satisfy the 
fair share." 51 The court defines least cost housing stringently: the least ex pen-
sive housing that builders can provide after the municipality removes all 
excessive restrictions and exactions and after the municipality has used all 
affirmative devices that might lower costs." 52 . 
While the Mount Laurel obligation could conceivably be satisfied by a 
local government's successful accomplishment of a lower-level responsibility 
on the hierarchy, 53 this is by no means guaranteed. A municipality may not 
find out whether it has fulfilled its constitutional obligation until its zoning 
ordinance is challenged in court and a judgment rendered on compliance or 
non-compliance. Accordingly, from a litigation-avoidance standpoint, a 
municipality will have a strong incentive to attempt to simultaneously meet 
all of the court-imposed hierarchical responsibilities, even though the lower-
level responsibilities are theoretically mutually exclusive. 
51. /d. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451. One of the difficulties in fully comprehending 
the Mount Laurel II decision is reconciling the court's "Summary of Rulings," id. 
at 214-20, 456 A.2d at 418-21, with the substantive discussion in the remainder of 
the opinion. In some cases, the summary contains different language and leads to 
possibly different interpretations than the actual text of the opinion. See infra note 58. 
52. 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451. The court presumes that such housing will 
be inexpensive enough to provide shelter for families who cannot afford housing in 
the conventional suburban market, although it will be unaffordable for those in the 
lower-income brackets. !d. The court states that at the minimum, ''provision of least 
cost housing will make certain that municipalities in 'growth' areas of this state do 
not 'grow' only for the well-to ... do." /d. Thus, the court expressly rejects a "filter 
down" or "trickle down" approach to providing housing for lower-income families, 
noting that this theory is defective in light of the general trend of housing now being 
built in suburban communities such as Mount Laurel Township to appreciate rather 
than to become affordable over time for lower-income families. According to the court's 
logic, ''Only if municipalities like Mount Laurel begin now to build lower income or 
least cost housing will some part of their housing stock ever 'filter down' to New Jersey's 
poorer families., !d. at 278, 456 A.2d at 452 (emphasis in original). It is not clear 
why lower cost or least cost housing is expected to depreciate in value when other 
housing has appreciated over time. The court's assumption is premised on continued 
regulation by municipalities of resale price ceilings and rentals for housing built pur-
suant to Mount Laurel II. This, however, would present economic disincentives for 
owners or developers to fully maintain and operate the housing in the first place, for 
the same reasons that rent control, in general, has created disincentives for upkeep, 
ownership and maintenance. See generally C. BAIRD, RENT CONTROL: THE PERENNIAL 
FoLLY 54-81 (1980). See also J. FRIED, HousiNG CRISIS U.S.A. 35-39 (1971) (discussing 
specific disincentives regarding New York's rent control experience); D. MANDELKER, 
HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 19-20 (1973) (discussing specific 
problems regarding England's rent control disincentives). For a general history of rent 
control measures throughout the world, see 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
292-95 (1953). 
53. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 258-60, 456 A.2d at 441-42. 
. 
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6. Potent Judicial Remedies for Municipal 
Failure to Meet Mount Laurel Obligation 
[VoL 15:573 
In the event that a municipality which includes a growth area or other-
wise is subject to a Mount Laurel II obligation54 is challenged in a lawsuit, 
the trial judge ·will make a threshold determination of ultimate fact: whether 
the zoning ordinance, taken together with any affirmative measures initiated 
by the municipal government, provides a realistic opportunity for meeting the 
municipality's fair share of the region's. present and prospective low- and 
moderate-income housing needs. If the trial court makes a determination that 
the municipal defendant has not ~atisfied its Mount Laurel obligation, the 
court is required to order the municipality to revise its zoning ordinance, within 
a specifie.d time period. 55 If the municipality fails to adequately revise its 
ordinance within the specified period, the trial court must implement the follow-
ing remedies for non-compliance. 56 
54. Even though a municipality is not in a ''growth area" on the SDGP, it could 
nevertheless be subject to a Mount Laurel obligation. See infra notes 236-50 and 
accompanying text. 
55. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278, 456 A.2d at 452. 
56. ld. The court's opinion is confusing with regard to this initial time period 
for municipal revision of a constitutionally infirm zoning ordinance and \Vhether a 
master may be appointed by the trial court,. against the wishes of a municipal defen-
dant, immediately following the judicial determination of ultimate fact that the 
municipality has failed to meet its Mount Laurel obligation. The court, on the one 
hand, clearly states that: 
If a trial court determines that a municipality has not met its Mount Laurel 
obligation, it shall order the municipality to revise its zoning ordinance within 
a set time period to comply with the constitutional mandate; if the municipality 
fails adequately to revise its ordinance within that time, the court shall in1ple-
ment the remedies for non-compliance outlined below. . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). At first blush, it would seem that a municipality may be given 
a flexible time period, set by the trial court, to modify its zoning ordinance on its 
own initiative. This time period, subject to a reasonableness standard, might be several 
months in duration. It would also seem from the above-quoted language that a trial 
court would not have the discretion, immediately after its initial determination of non-
compliance, to order a master to "assist" the municipality. A municipality; of course, 
would have an economic incentive to avoid a master, since it would ultimately have 
to pay for the master's services. See id. at 281 n.38, 45-6 A.2d at 453 n.38. However, 
a later portion of the court's opinion confuses the holdings. Under the heading "Revi-
sion of the Zoning Ordinance: The Master," the court states: 
If the trial court determines that a municipality's zoning ordinance does 
not satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation, it shall order the defendant to revise 
it. Unless it is clear that a requisite realistic opportunity can be otherwise 
provided, the trial court should direct the municipality to incorporate in that 
new ordinance· the affirmative devices discussed above most likely to lead 
to the construction of lower income housing. The trial court shall order the 
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(a) Builder's remedy 
This remedy allows a successful plaintiff builder to construct a project 
which provides a substantial amount of lower-income housing on land owned 
by the defendant municipality. It is granted by the trial court unless the 
municipality ''establishes that because of environmental or other substantial 
planning concerns, the plaintiff's proposed project is clearly contrary to sound 
land use planning. '' 57 Trial court determinations of whether a builder's remedy 
should apply would be made on a case by case basis, 58 although the supreme 
court, in expressly overruling a portion of its decision in Oakwood at Madison, 
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 59 stated that where the builder proposes a viable 
project, the builder's remedy should be granted in order to make these remedies 
more readily available. 60 
(b) Order to revise the zoning ordinance, order appointing a master 
A trial judge faced with a non-complying municipal defendant is also given 
authority under Mount Laurel II to (1) order the defendant to change its zon-
ing ordinance by a date certain; (2) order that specific affirmative devices such 
as mandatory set asides, subsidies, and other inclusionary zoning devices 
previously discussed be incorporated into the new zoning ordinance; and (3) 
order the appointment of a special master to assist municipal officials in 
developing constitutional zoning and land use requirements. 61 
(c) Remedies for municipal non-compliance with trial court order to revise 
zoning ordinance 
revision to be completed within 90 days of its original judgment against the 
municipality. For good cause shown, a municipality may be granted an 
extension of that time period . 
. To facilitate this revision, the trial court may appoint a special master to 
assist munic~pal officials in developing constitutional zoning and land use 
regulations. 
/d. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453 (emphasis added). The confusion between the two passages 
of the opinion arises because the supreme court instructs the trial court to order com-
pletion of the revised zoning ordinance "within 90 days of its original judgment against 
the municipality'' and allows the appointment of a master. However, such a construc-
tion directly contradicts the more flexible self-revised approach allowed by the first 
passage. 
57. !d. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452. 
58. While the textual discussion in Mount Laurel II does not contain the language 
"case by case," the language is contained in the "Summary of Rulings." /d. at 218, 
456 A.2d at 420. This is a recurrent problem in interpreting the Mount Laurel II opinion. 
59. 72 N.J. 481, 551 n.50, 371 A.2d 1192, 1227 n.50 (1977). 
60. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279, 456 A.2d at 452. 
61. /d. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453. The master's services would be paid for by 
the defendant municipality. /d. at 281 n.38, 456 A.2d at 453 n.38. 
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In the event that a defendant municipality under an order to revise its 
zoning ordinance either fails to submit a revised ordinance within the time 
specified by the court order, or fails to satisfy the trial court that the revised 
ordinance meets the Mount Laurel II obligation, the trial court has great judicial 
power to force compliance by issuing such orders as are appropriate including 
any one or more of the following: 62 
(1) that the municipality adopt such resolutions and ordinances, 
including particular amendments to its zoning ordinance, and other 
land use regulations, as will enable it to meet its Mount Laurel 
obligations; 
(2) that certain types of proje_cts or construction as may be specified 
by the trial court be delayed within the municipality until its ordinance 
is satisfactorily revised, or until all or part of its fair share of lower 
income housing is constructed and/or firm commitments for its con-
struction have been made by responsible developers; 
(3) that the zoning .ordinance and the land use regulations of the 
municipality be deemed void in whole or in part so as to relax or 
eliminate building and use restrictions in all or selected portions of 
the municipality (the court may condition this remedy upon failure 
of the mu_nicipality to adopt resolutions or ordinances mentioned in 
(1) above); and 
(4) that particular applications to ·construct housing that includes 
lower income units be approved by the municipality, or any officer, 
board, agency, authority (independent or otherwise) or division 
thereof. 63 
The supreme court acknowledged that the aforementioned coercive 
remedial powers, authorized after previous court orders have been violated, 
are more of an administrative and legislative nature than of a judicial nature, 
and that these potential remedies go beyond the ken of traditional judicial 
remedies. 64 Moreover, basing its sweeping remedial changes on the mandate 
of the New Jersey Constitution, the court frankly admits that it is risking 
its judicial legitimacy with this mandate. 65 
62. /d. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455. The court's language, "including any one 
or more of the following," would seem to limit a trial court's discretion to the par-
ticular orders enumerated by the court. However, in light of the considerable discre-
tion and power vested in Mount Laurel// trial courts by the supreme coures. opinion, 
it is arguable that the court would tolerate other types_ of coercive orders not specifically 
enumerated in the opinion. 
63. /d. 
64. ld. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456. 
65. /d. Compare this statement to the coures concern about its power to under-
take unconventional remedies in institutional litigation. !d. at 288-90, 456 A.2d at 457-58. 
• 
• 
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7. Modification of the Usual Appellate Rules 
and Common Law Doctrine 
589 
The supreme court substantially modified the usual rules of appellate 
procedure66 and the res judicata effect of compliance judgments6 ' in future 
Mount Laurel litigation. Regarding the former modification, the court held 
that barring the most unusual circumstances, 68 the judiciary should handle 
Mount Laurel II cases to dispose of the litigation in all of its aspects with 
one trial and one appeal with stays and interlocutory appeals being the rare 
exception rather than the rule. 69 Thus, if a municipality takes an appeal, all 
aspects of the case will be considered by the appellate court including both 
the correctness of the lower court's decision on invalidity, the scope of the 
remedies imposed on the municipality, and the validity of the ordinance adopted 
after the determination of invalidity. 70 The court chose to take this approach, 
despite the prospect that if the appellate court finds that the trial court's in-
itial determination of failure to comply with Mount Laurel was wrong from 
the outset, ''all of the steps subsequently taken by the municipality to comply 
. . . may have been wasted energy." 71 
The second modification alters the usual rule that the common law doc-
trine of res judicata does not apply to all situations, such as a judicial deter-
mination of municipal compliance with its Mount Laurel obligation, where 
circumstances may have changed after the date of entry of the judgment. The 
court, borrowing the six year period for municipal reexamination and amend-
ment of its land use regulations set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law, 72 
held that "[c]ompliance judgments in [Mount Laurel] cases ... shall have 
res judicata effect, despite changed circumstances, for a period of six years, 
66. /d. at 290-91, 456 A.2d at 458. The greatest modification was in the area 
of interlocutory appeals. The standard practice is to allow interlocutory appeals to 
the appellate division or to the supreme court. See generally N.J. CT. R. 2:2-4, 2:2-5, 
2:3-1, and 2:5-6 (1984). Moreover, pursuant to common law exceptions to the final 
judgment rule, courts in the past have allowed appeals of orders which are apparently 
interlocutory but actually final. See, e.g., Kriegsman v. Kriegsman, 150 N.J. Super. 
474, 375 A.2d 1253 (App. Div. 1977) (a trial court order relieving or declining to relieve 
counsel during the pendency of an action is appealable); State v. Evangelista, 134 N.J. 
Super. 64, 338 A.2d 224 (Law Div. 1975) (an order of the juvenile court waiving its 
jurisdiction is appealable). The court's modification of appellate procedures, however, 
leaves intact the ability of a Mount Laurel II trial court to certify an interlocutory 
order pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 4:42-2 (1984). 
67. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 291-92, 456 A.2d at 459. 
68. /d. at 290-91, 456 A.2d at 458. 
69. /d. at 218, 456 A.2d at 420. The court's standard for allowing an exception 
to its stay of an interlocutory appeal ruling is vague. See id. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 290, 456 A.2d at 458 (emphasis added). 
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:660-1 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
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the period to begin with the entry of judgment by the trial court. " 73 This 
ruling, however, was weakened by the court's footnote reference that ''a 
substantial transformation of the municipality ... may trigger a valid Mount 
Laurel claim before the six years have expired. " 74 
To summarize, the supreme court made radically new law in Mount Laurel 
II in seven major holdings. Most significantly, the court replaced the ''develop-
ing municipality" standard with a new benchmark which looks to whether 
any portion of a New Jersey municipality is in a "growth area" as designated 
in the State Development Guide Plan; the court mandated that all municipalities 
in the state, no matter what planning regions are designated in th~ SDG.P, 
must provide a realistic opportunity for housing for their indigenous poor; 
and the court ruled that a defendant municipality can no longer escape the 
imposition of judicial remedies in future Mount Laurel litigation by asserting 
a good faith defense. The next three sections of this Article explore the second-
order consequences of Mount Laurel II. 
II. SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES 
A.. Overview 
Major judicial policy decisions such as Mount Laurel II involve secon-
dary repercussions which are unanticipated and ignored in judicial monitor-
ing and follow-up. These repercussions entail social costs that are more dif-
ficult to verify than the decision's intended benefits and cause widely borne 
social costs which may surface much later than the ruling itself. Second-order 
consequences also may have negative synergistic effects as one consequence 
affects others. 75 Moreover, while an appellate court, such as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in its Mount Laurel II decision, might flag a number of poten-
tial effects in the course of its policymaking decision, these judicially 
acknowledged repercussions may still constitute second-order consequences 
when the full dimensions of the impact are not considered in the decision in 
chief. 
73. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 291-92, 456 A.2d at 459. 
74. /d. at 292 n.44, 456 A.2d at 459 n.44 (emphasis added). The court presumed 
a six-year period of municipal immunity from other Mount Laurel II suits following 
a compliance judgment. The court ignored the fact that th~ six year planning cycle 
could be substantially different from the six-year period following a judgment of com-
pliance. For example, if a particular municipality adopted its original master plan on 
January l, 1977, updated its master plan on January l, 1983, and obtained a com-
pliance judgment in Mount Laurel II litigation on December 1, 1988, the municipality 
would risk triggering the "substantial transformation" test by any revision of its master 
plan on January 1, 1989, as scheduled. Thus, instead of having a six-year period of 
repose from the date of the compliance judgment (December 1, 1988), the municipality 
would face the prospect of having only a few months repose before another litigant 
could challenge its master plan. 
15. These effects might be termed third-order consequences. For purposes of 
discussion, however, this Article labels all of the unforeseen consequences as second-
order consequences. 
• 
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So analyzed, a partial working inventory of potential second-order conse-
quences of the Mount Laurel II decision is provided below. The listing is not 
exhaustive, detailed or even accurately predictive. It is presented for heuristic 
purposes only. Indeed, even if only a small percentage of the possible second-
order consequences of Mount Laurel II come to pass, significant social costs 
will be incurred. After a brief sketch of land use and zoning changes effected 
by Mount Laurel II, this Article will consider a more focused study of one 
particular second-order consequence: the impact of the Mount Laurel II deci-
sion on future solar energy development in the state. 76 Other potential political, 
economic and social second-orde-r consequences of the decision follow in Part 
IV. 
B. Zoning and Land Use Consequences 
1. The Judiciary's Role as a Super-Zoning 
Board will Vastly Increase. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has effectively judicialized zoning deci-
sions on a statewide basis. The court's elaborate and forceful remedial holdings 
create a standard of judicial review analogous to the ''hard look'' doctrine 
in federal environmental litigation. 77 Courts are admonished not to defer to 
local land use decisions or consider a zoning challeng_e in isolation, but must 
scrutinize the municipality's entire zoning ordinance, its regional effects and 
any affirmative measures taken to construct lower-income housing. 78 The ''hard 
look" doctrine is applicable to both trial and appellate courts. 79 
The three Mount Laurel judges selected to implement the mandate enjoy 
extraordinary judicial powers-,_ akin to independent agency commissioners with 
wide responsibilities to implement a specific piece of legislation. Simultaneously, 
the supreme court encouraged these judges to impose freely precise zoning 
76. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text. 
77. Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia originated the "hard look" doctrine in Environmental Defense Fund,- Inc~ 
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Reviewing the Secretary of Agriculture's 
refusal to suspend or commence proceedings to suspend the registration of the pesti~ide 
DDT, the court of appeals determined that a stricter standard of review was required 
in environmental litigation. Judge Bazelon observed that matters which touch on "fun-
damental personal interest in life, health and liberty . . . have always had a special 
claim to judicial protection" and remanded the matter for further proceedings. ld. 
at 598. The court of appeals' expression was reiterated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), where the 
Court addressed the Secretary of Transportation's scope of authority under the Federal 
Aid Highway Act of 1966; 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-141 (Supp. V 1984). The Court indicated 
that its review was to be "thorough, probing and in ... depth." 401 U.S~ at 415. Both courts 
emphasized the special nature of environmental matters as reasons for expanding the 
scope of courts' review. A-pparently, the special need for low-income housing in this 
state also justified the state supreme court's stricter standard of review. 
78. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 281-85, 456 A.2d at 453 .. 55. 
79. See id. at 218, 290, 456 A.2d at 420, 458-59. 
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ordinances, to solicit vigorously the involvement of hybrid masters and other 
experts, and to become involved generally with the details of local land use 
planning. 80 
That judges' decisions regarding pertinent regions and regional need are 
binding on non-party municipalities within that region81 closely resembles the 
rulemaking powers of an administrative agency. Indeed, this Judicial power 
goes beyond the model of agency rulemaking since the Mount Laurel judges 
are not expressly required to provide notice or an opportunity for comment 
to affected municipalities. 82 Trial courts may alter the SDGP determination 
through which municipalities are subject to a regional fair share obligation 
by allowing the Mount Laurel courts to reclassify a municipality if it encourages 
or allows growth. 83 If the SDGP is not revised after January 1, 1985, the special 
courts will have ''considerable discretion'' to vary the contours of the SDGP. 84 
Thus, given strict scrutiny of municipal zoning ordinances and greatly increased 
judicial power to enforce compliance and alter SDGP planning determina-
tions, the judiciary \viii be setting important details of land use ordinances 
in the state. 
2. Land Use Decisionmaking Has Been Forcibly 
Shifted from Decentralized to Centralized Control. 
In Mount Laurel II the supreme court elevated the importance of centrally 
promulgated, regional and statewide master plans despite the absence of per-
suasive legislative ~nd administrative authority to justify this action. 85 In the 
process the court debased the value of municipal master plans, which, accord-
ing to the court's reasoning, are now subject to preemptive override by con-
flicting centrally developed state planning documents. Moreover, the SDGP 
has apparently been given primacy over other conflicting state-developed or 
regionally-developed plans .. 
The supreme court's interpretation of the legislature's intent in passing 
the statute86 establishing the role of the Division of State and Regional Plann-
ing in the Department of Community Affairs can be accurately described as 
80. See id. at 245-46, 253-55, 456 A.2d at 434-35, 439-40. 
81. /d. at 254, 456 A.2d at 439. While the court indicates that non-party 
municipalities may attempt to intervene or the court may require their joinder, it seems 
that the language of the supreme court's opinion discourages such joinder or interven-
tion because it may complicate the litigation. /d. Moreover, the supreme court leaves 
it to the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a non~party municipality 
will be allowed to intervene. Fundamental rules of r~s judicata and collateral estoppel 
dictate that if a non-party municipality will be bound by a determination of region 
and regional housing needs, it must have the right to intervene. 
82. /d. 
83. ld. at 241-42:, 248 n.2l, 456 A.2d at 432-33, 435 n.2l. 
84. Id. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33. 
85. See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text. 
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § ll:lB-15.52 (West 1979). 
1984] SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 593 
a double extrapolation. The court extended the legislature's purposes in enact-
ing the Department's enabling statute and extended the purposes of the Divi-
sion of State and Regional Planning in writing the SDGP. In reviewing the 
enabling act in juxtaposition with the SDGP, the court created new common 
law by analogous reasoning from non-judicial sources. 87 
Contrary to the supreme court's expansive and far-ranging interpretation, 
the legislature did not mandate or intend a ''statewide blueprint for future 
development" 88 when it charged the Division of State and Regional Planning 
with ''preparing and maintaining a comprehensive guide plan and long term 
development and capital improvement program for the future improvement 
and development of the State. " 89 Nor did the legislature mandate or intend 
the SDGP as a document that must be used for the purpose of deciding where 
growth should be encouraged, discouraged, permitted and prohibited in New 
Jersey. 90 A more reasonable interpretation of the 1961 enabling statute would 
have viewed it as a legislative request for administrative development of 
information to be used by local, state and federal officials to coordinate plan-
ning efforts and promote sensible and efficient land use policies. The court 
overstates the agency interpretation given by the Division of State and Regional 
Planning to the enabling act as requiring ''a plan that would guide and influence 
the location of future development, including residential development. '' 91 The 
SDGP recommends where future development and conservation efforts in New 
Jersey should be concentrated. The SDGP did recognize that while it might 
have some indirect impact on social, economic and psychological goals, it is 
essentially an advocacy plan for the preservation and efficient use of the State's 
physical resources. However, "it functions by recommending where growth-
inducing investments should and should not be made so that these resources 
are used efficiently to achieve fundamental statewide goals. " 92 Thus, the SDGP 
• 
87. There is a tradition of utilizing non-judicial sources, particularly statutes, 
as material for growth and development of the common law. See generally Landis, 
Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 213 (1934); Stone, The 
Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 11-14 (1936); Traynor, Statutes 
Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 401, 405-26 (1968). See also 
R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 121-26 (1974). 
88. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423. 
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.52(a)(2) (West 1979). 
90. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 230, 456 Aw2d at 426. 
91. /d. at 227, 456 A.2d at 425. 
92. DIVISION OF STATE & REGIONAL PLANNING, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CoM-
MUNITY AFFAJRS, STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN ii-iv (May 1980) [hereinafter cited 
as STATE DEVELOPMENT GuiDE PLAN]. The Guide Plan states that it 
provides a long-range, statewide perspective which transcends functional and 
departmental lines. It is designed to assist the Governor's Office of Policy 
and Planning and the v~rious Cabinet Committees it serves, as well as other 
agencies of government. In the final analysis implementation of the Guide 
Plan will depend upon its utility to those agencies and the extent to which 
• 
• 
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is, at best, equivocal about whether it was to be a binding regional blueprint 
for determining the appropriateness of publicly funded, growth-inducing 
developments such as highways and sewers. The SDGP states that the inten-
tion of the Division of Planning was that the Guide Plan be used in functional 
planning by State agencies, that county, regional and federal agencies take 
into account the plans, concept, and that some progress be made toward 
establishing a unified statewide land use and investment policy .93 
The legislature did not view the SDGP as a top-to-bottom legislative man-
date of where future growth and development should or should not take place. 94 
It is reasonable to conclude that both the legislative and executive branches 
envisioned that primary prescriptive land use decisionmaking would continue 
on a local, decentralized basis, albeit with municipal consideration of the rela-
tionship of the proposed development of the municipality, as articulated in 
its master plan, to the master plans of contiguous municipalities, the master 
its recommendations are expressed in the programs and policies of the State 
government. 
/d. at iv. 
93. /d. at iii. While housing and residential development is discussed in the STATE 
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, the analysis is theoretical and general rather than prescriptive 
and detailed. Indeed, the problem of lower-income housing was presented in extremely 
vague terms: 
Suburbanization and the shift of employment locations to areas outside 
the central cities have led to problems of restricted housing opportunities for 
some income groups. Many New Jersey residents, particularly low- and 
moderate-income families, have difficulty in finding affordable housing near 
their jobs . Recognizing this problem, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 
1975 Mount Laurel decision held that all "developing" municipalities should 
provide opportunities for a "fair share" of regional housing needs within 
their borders. However, the impact of this and subsequent decisions, at least 
at the present time and in view of the economic constraints, has been minimal. 
A major challenge in the coming years will be to provide a variety of hous-
ing opportunities in appropriate locations for New Jersey's expanding popula-
tion. Single persons and young couples, families with growing children, and 
the elderly all have different housing needs and tastes. The economics of the 
housing market requires efforts by both the State and the Nation. Solutions 
to the problems of the cost, variety and location of new housing will have 
to be found if present and future residents are to enjoy decent homes in good 
residential environments. 
STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 6-7. 
94. A single exception to this statement would be with regard to environmentally 
critical areas, to wit, the Pinelands and the coastal zone. In these areas the State clearly 
did indicate a top-to-bottom legislative mandate of where and how development should 
take place. This had already been done in other statutes. See Pinelands Protection Act, 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ l3:18A-l to -29 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); Hackensack Meadowlands 
Reclamation and Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West 1979); 
Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979). 
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plan of the county in which the municipality is located and any comprehen-
sive guide plan formulated under the statute. 95 
In making the SDGP the centerpiece of its reconstituted constitutional 
doctrine, the supreme court converted a voluntary informational and 
coordinating guide for state, county, and local officials into an involuntary 
blueprint for municipal development mandated by the state. While the court 
noted that the SDGP may become ''inappropriate" for continued use as a 
standard for determining constitutional obligation, 96 the pragmatic reality is 
that municipalities who spurn the SDGP after Mount Laurel II will do so 
at their own peril. Regardless of whether the SDGP was a voluntary guide 
for municipal consideration before the supreme court's ruling, it is now a bind-
ing mandate caught up in the very fabric of the court's constitutional remedy 
in Mount Laurel II. 
Repercussions of the decision go beyond usurpation of municipal autonomy 
and derogation of legislative intent. Mount Laurel// will also have a tendency 
to interfere with intra-executive policymaking by virtue of the planning primacy 
the decision accords to the SDGP developed by the Department of Community 
Affairs. Indeed, that Department might interpret the court's far-ranging dicta 
to justify a decision to overrule a planning decision by a sister agency of state 
government such as the Departments of Energy, Transportation or Agriculture. 
Mount Laurel II also undermines some policy assumptions made by the pro-
fessional planners who wrote the SDGP. The SDGP planners did not know 
that their designation of growth areas would trigger affirmative municipal 
obligations to provide thousands of units of lower-income housing on a 
statewide basis. 97 The mapping of growth areas by the Department might have 
been different had this requirement been an explicit part of the planning 
process. Population projections for the state, 98 urban strategy, 99 and assump-
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-28(d) (West 1979). This statute was partially quoted 
by the Mount Laurel II court. 92 N.J. at 228, 456 A.2d at 425. Indeed, in a paradox-
ical admission at the end of its review and amplification of the STATE DEVELOPMENT 
GuiDE PLAN, the Mount Laurel court notes the essentially non-binding, voluntary nature 
of the STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN: 
Except for protective legislation (such as that pertaining to the Pinelands and 
certain coastal areas) limited to particular ecologically sensitive areas, the state 
has imposed no prescriptions against development. While conformity of the 
constitutional obligation to the design of the Plan unquestionably advances 
the state's purposes, the absence of such prescription against development 
may, in the long run, undermine the regional planning objectives of the SDGP, 
whether we limit the Mount Laurel obligation to growth areas or not. 
92 N.J. at 247-48, 456 A.2d at 435 (emphasis added). 
96. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text. 
97. See STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 6. 
98. !d. at 2-5. 
99. I d. at 15-16. 
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tions about infrastructure development 100 might also have been fundamentally 
different. While the court left open the opportunity for the Department to 
modify the SDGP in the future, 101 such court-sanctioned modification, linked 
as it is to municipal constitutional obligation, destabilizes long-range municipal 
fiscal planning and municipal assessment of legal responsibilities to zone for 
lower-income housing. 
3. Important Purposes of Zoning Outside of 
"Health and Safety" Considerations will be Eclipsed. 
The bedrock constitutional responsibility of growing municipalities in tak-
ing steps to comply with Mount Laurel II is the removal of zoning and sub-
division restrictions and exactions that are not necessary to protect health and 
safety. 102 While the court indicates that once compliance with Mount Laurel 
II is assured, a municipality may undertake other "restrictive provisions 
incompatible with lower income housing,'' 103 the court creates doubt about 
the continued validity and scope of other ''general welfare'' purposes of zon-
ing such as energy, aesthetics and historical preservation. 104 
ln discussing municipal zoning responsibilities regarding mobile homes, 
for example, the court ambiguously states that it recognizes the propriety of 
aesthetic considerations in zoning, but that "the 'subjective sensibilities' of 
present residents are not a sufficient basis for the exclusion of the poor.'' 1 os 
Taken together with its admonition for municipalities to eliminate all restric-
tive and cost generating exactions not necessary for health and safety, 106 it 
would seem that the court has eliminated aesthetic zoning as well as other 
"general welfare" objectives such as energy conservation and historical preser-
vation from zones set aside for lower-income housing. Because municipal com-
pliance with Mount Laurel II will often involve overzoning for low- and 
moderate-income housing, 107 it is apparent that the court has relegated "general 
welfare'' zoning purposes to an inferior status. Moreover, since a municipality 
will not know whether it is in compliance with Mount Laurel II until it is 
100. /d. at 16-17. 
101. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33. 
102. See id. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441. 
103 . . I d. at 259-60, 456 A.2d at 442. 
104. Compare Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441 with N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:550,.2 (West 1983) (legislative purposes of zoning and planning). This list 
of legislatively sanctioned zoning and planning purposes comprises a wide variety of 
general welfare purposes, contrary to the supreme court's narrowing of permissible 
zoning actions, under Mount Laurel II, to health and safety purposes. 
105. Mount Laurel//., 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451 (citing Vickers v. Township 
Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 269, 181 A.2d 129, 149-50 (1962) (Hall, 
J., dissenting)). 
106. /d. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441. 
107. !d. at 262 n.26, 456 A.2d at 453 n.26 (citing Oakwood at Madison, Inc. 
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 48},, 519, 371 A.2d 1192, 1210-11 (1977)). 
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challenged in court, and is subject to future suit notwithstanding an existing 
judgment for compliance, prudent zoning policy would dictate the eschewal 
of "general welfare" zoning purposes such as aesthetics, energy, and historical 
preservation, since these might be considered to be exclusionary zoning devices 
by a court. 108 
4. The Directive to Eliminate Cost Generating 
.Municipal Housing Regulation Ignores Long-Range 
Life-Cycle Cost Savings of Many Construction Practices. 
The supreme court's absolute insistence on municipal elimination of cost-
generating building standards and exactions, unnecessary for health and safety, 
ignores the fundamental economic reality that some building improvements, 
while initially cheaper, are more costly over the life of the building than other 
improvements. This concept is particularly true with regard to a building's 
energy system, •09 but is also applicable to exterior improvements that may 
have to be replaced prematurely because of shoddiness in original 
construction. 110 
5. Increased Density Will Cause Substantial 
Ripple Effects in Many Areas. 
Increased density in housing development is a central concept in the court's 
mandate that municipalities undertake affirmative measures to assure the con-
struction of their fair share of lower-.income regional housing. Widespread 
municipal use of density bonuses, leading to too-intensive development could, 
however, have several unintended negative effects. First, too high densities 
can have an adverse impact on the psychological well-being of residents. 111 
Second, over-intensive development can cause accelerated deterioration of 
physical facilities and supporting infrastructure. 11 2 Third, too dense develop-
ment can result in an ugly, aesthetically unappealing appearancel' Finally, as 
discussed in greater detail in Part III, modern and efficient alternative energy 
designs for homes require reasonable access to sunlight and minimization of 
• 
108. The court's statement that it did not intend the opinion to result ·in environmen-
tally harmful consequences, and that its concern for protection of the environment 
is a strong one, is inextricably linked to health and safety concerns. 92 N.J. at 331 
n .. 68, 456 A.2d at 479~80 n.68 (citing Mount Laurel!, 61 N.J. at 186-87, 336 A.2d 
at 173). Indeed, the ·court implied as much in stating that "[w]here a particular pro-
posed lower income development will result in substantial environmental degradation, 
such a development should not be required or encouraged." !d. 
109;; See generally N. SHAW & J. BAUER, A NEW JERSEYAN's CoNSUMER GuiDE 
TO SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS: WITH AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 114 (1978). See· a/so infra 
note 156 and accompanying text. 
110. Bernstein, Why Mount Laurel Won,t Work . .. Unless, STATE BAR MouNT 
LAUREL II REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-5. 
Ill. ld. 
112. ld. 
• 
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northern exposures. Over-intensive development could stifle and discourage 
such energy planning. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF Mount Laurel II ON 
FuTURE SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN NEw JERSEY 
A. National and Statewide Importance of Solar Energy Development 
With lower short-term oil prices and better supply, policymakers may forget 
the American imperative to take intelligent steps toward a more balanced system 
of energy sources instead of continuing to rely on imported oil. 113 Yet rational 
energy development is still the ''moral equivalent of war,'' 114 and there is wide 
consensus that energy independence is one of our nation's most important 
long-range priorities. 115 
Of all the potential options in managing this necessary national transition 
from energy dependence to energy autonomy, solar energy and conservation 
are the most promising. According to experts at the Harvard Business School's 
Energy Project, domestic oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear energy cannot deliver 
vastly increased supplies in future years, although these traditional energy 
sources cannot be ignored. 116 The Harvard report concludes that America has 
only two major alternatives for the rest of this century "to import more 
oil or to accelerate the development of conservation and solar energy.'' 1 17 This 
Article will focus on residential solar space and hot water heating. 
113. See ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD 
BusiNEss SCHOOL 216 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin, eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY 
fUTURE]. 
114. I PUB. PAPERS 656 (Apr. 18, 1977) (President Carter). 
115. See generally sources collected and cited in ENERGY FuTURE, supra note 1 ! 3. 
116. /d. at 216. 
117. /d. Solar energy is not a single homogenous energy source, but a generic 
term that covers a variety of renewable energy technologies, some modern and some 
ancient. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, these are: (1) thermal, including 
heating and cooling of buildings and hot water and agricultural and industrial process 
heating; (2) fuels from biomass, including wood and waste; and (3) solar electricity, 
. . 
including photovoltaic (solar cell), wind, hydro·power and solar and ocean thermal 
applications. See ENERGY FuTuRE, supra note 113, at 184. 
For general background information on the unique opportunities as well as obstacles 
for increased solar energy development in the United States, see L. Corr, WIND ENERGY: 
LEGAL ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979); 
G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAW: PROTECTING ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT FOR SOLAR ENERGY 
SYSTEMS (l979); S. JOHNSON, A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO SOLAR ENERGY 
INCENTIVES (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979); J. LAITOS, EcoNOMIC AND 
REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY UTILITY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND DECENTRALIZED 
. . . 
SoLAR APPLICATIONS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1981 ); J. LAITos & R. FEVERS-
TEIN, REGULATED UTniTIES AND SOLAR ENERGY: A LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
MAJOR IssUEs AFFECTING THE SOLAR Co:MMERCIALIZATION EFFORT (Solar Energy Research 
Institute, 1980); J. OVERDORF, LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM PASSIVE SOLAR ENERGY 
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Solar space heating is the most mature form of solar technology. 118 It 
is largely an ''on site'' technology: the heating system is designed for a given 
structure or small group of structures. In contrast, other solar technologies 
are more centralized and capable of delivering energy to a larger number of 
buildings. Examples of the latter type include solar thermal electric, ocean 
thermal electric and hydropower dams. 
Solar heating can be further subdivided into ''passive" and ''active'' 
technologies. Passive solar energy relies on energy conscious architecture and 
design, rather than on an actual heat storage and distribution system. Thus, 
a passive solar home has no moving parts; its heating "system" consists of 
a massive south-facing wall with large double-paned windows combined with 
improved conservation technologies. The massive wall absorbs sunlight 
throughout the day and releases heat at night to provide a continuously warm 
.. air temperature in the home. Active solar heating, on the other hand, involves 
mechanical moving parts such as solar collectors that heat air or water which 
moves through pipes. The air or water is then fanned or pumped through 
a heat exchanger in a water-filled storage tank. This hot water can be used 
to heat the house directly or can heat the house by pumping it through a 
radiator. 
Energy experts agree that solar heating could significantly decrease the 
United States' consumption of other sources of energy during this decade, 119 
and by the end of the twentieth century. 12° For most of this decade, solar 
heating is expected to have its principal effect in the form of active systems, 
especially for heating water. 121 More importantly, its major impact, if allowed 
to develop fully, would be <?n new structures. Passive solar technology is most 
efficient and is easily incorporated in new _construction at little or no extra 
cost. Retrofits onto existing buildings, on the other hand, are more expensive. 122 
The same is true of active solar systems, although they do add to the price 
of a new home. 
Solar and energy conserving new construction is especially important for 
New Jersey for several reasons. First, the ramifications of the increases in 
the price of oil and petroleum products are felt more severely in New Jersey 
than elsewhere because the state is exceptionally dependent on petroleum. 1 2 3 
New Jersey is also more dependent on foreign-produced oil than the nation 
SYSTEMS (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1980); P. SPIVAK, LAND-USE BARRIERS AND 
INCENTIVES TO THE UsE OF SOLAR ENERGY (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1979); 
W. THOMAS & A. MILLER, OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR 
ENERGY SYSTEMS ( 197 8). 
118. See ENERGY FUTURE; supra note 113, at 186. 
119. !d. 
120. SeeS. KRAEMER, SoLAR LAw 1 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SoLAR LAw]. 
121. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 113, at 187. 
122. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE NEW JERSEY ENERGY MASTER PLAN 
6 (Oct. 1978) (hereinafter cited as ENERGY MASTER PLAN]. 
123. /d. 
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as a whole. 124 According to the New Jersey Department of Energy, about 
twenty-eight percent of the petroleum used in New Jersey in 1980 was used 
by the residential and commercial sectors for heating and another five percent 
by the industrial sector for heating. 125 The Department of Energy estimates 
that by the year 2000 solar energy could produce twenty-five million British 
thermal units (Btus) annually, and that figure could be substantially increased 
by, among other things, governmental policies to encourage the use of solar 
energy. 126 Further, the Department pointed out that the solar energy industry 
is relatively inflation~proof and generates jobs while keeping consumers' energy 
. . . 
dollars in the local economy. 121 
According to pre-Mount Laurel II estimates by the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Energy, at least seve.nty-five percent of the approximately 400,000 
new single family homes that will be built in New Jersey between 1985 and 
2000 could have solar hot water systems; fifty percent of those homes could 
integrate passive solar heating techniques; an additional ten percent could have 
active solar heating systems. 12·8 Finally, state energy officials estimate that at 
least ten percent of the industrial and commercial establishments in existence 
in the year 2000 could use solar energy. 129 If these projections are accurate, 
twenty-five million Btus of energy would be produced in New Jersey annually. 130 
B. The New Jersey Energy Master Plan 
In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature, finding that the state was threatened 
by the prospect of both short- and long-term energy shortages, 131 statutorily 
created a cabinet-level Department of Energy to ensure the wise and efficient 
production, distribution, use and conservation of energy. 132 In passing this 
statute, the legislature expressly delegated to the Department broad powers 
to conduct and implement emergency and long-range planning. These 
administrative responsibilities included the development of a ten-year Energy 
Master Plan to be periodically updated. 133 The legislature required the newly-
formed Department of Energy to promulgate this Master Plan within a year 
of the passage of the enabling act. To this end, the Department was given 
• 
124. /d. at 7. 
125. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ENERGY 
MASTER PLAN 1981, at B-19 (hereinafter cited as 1981 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]. 
126. /d. 
, 
127. /d. Currently, about 980Jo of a New Jerseyan,s dollar spent on energy goes 
out of state, and some portion of that out of the country. This is a severe drain on 
our local economy. See id. at C-24. 
128. /d. at B-19. 
129. /d. 
130. /d. 
131. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
132. See id. § 52:27F-4. 
133. Id. § 52:27F-14. See generally ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122. 
• 
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power to colle·ct a wide range of energy information necessary to carry out 
its responsibilities.t 34 The legislature also granted standing to the Department 
to intervene in any proceeding involving the control, production, transmis-
sion, use, or storage of any form ofenergy. 05 Other state regulatory agencies 
were required to give the Department notice of any proceeding which might 
affect the goals or implementation of the Energy Master Plan; the legislative 
scheme placed the burde·n on New Jersey regulatory agencies to bring state· 
government plans, projects, and regulations into conformance with this Plan.' 36 
In 1978, the Department, after several public hearings, issued the Energy 
Master Plan. The Plan detailed the past major energy transitions: from the 
use of wood, water wheels and windmills to coal, and from coal to petroleum 
and natural gas. According to the Plan, what might have been the third 
transition to nuclear power appears to have been largely interrupte_d 
by environmental and safety regulatory delays, greatly increased costs, and 
' ' 
slowed consumption of energy. 137 The third necessary transition, then, was 
thought to be from petroleum to a mix of fuels. The Plan specifically called 
for a diversification of the state's energy resources to include conservation 
and renewable energy sources such as solar energy. 138 
New Jersey's Energy Master Plan outlined three major goals: to assure 
uninterrupted energy supply to all users; to promote economic growth while 
' ' 
safeguarding environmental quality; and to encourage the lowest possible energy 
cost consistent with the conversation and efficient use of energy. 139 The 
Department of Energy wrote several policy papers to detail how it intended 
to meet these goals. The conservation policies focused on six critical areas 
where conservation could substantially reduce energy use: residential, com-
mercial and industrial conservation programs, electric and gas prices, and 
transportation patterns. 140 The Department also called for energy impact 
information to be included in existing state permit applications, and ruled that 
it play a direct role in the approvals of large developments and projects, by 
requiring large developers to file a statement for departmental review indicating 
the type and extent of fuel usage proposed. 141 The Plan advised that local 
planning boards retain the responsibility of determining the energy impact of 
purely local construction.l 42 
As for New Jersey's indigenous sources of energy, the Department focused 
on solar energy and solid waste as the two most promising and significant 
134. ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 1. 
135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-15 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
136. The Department also has co-equal jurisdiction to site energy facilities and 
authority to set energy prices and conduct res_earch and development projects. ld. 
137. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 3-6. 
138. /d. at 11. 
139. /d. at 13. 
140. See id. at 20-30. 
141. !d. at 23. 
142. Id. 
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rene,wable resources. The Plan determined that both solar energy and solid 
waste energy were technologically and economically feasible and have great 
continuing potential as alternatives to existing sources of energy. 143 The Depart-
ment of Energy, therefore, recommended a state solar policy with a three-fold 
purpose: to provide incentives to a growing solar industry while allowing the 
market system to prove the cost-effectiveness of solar technology;, to ensure 
the reliability of solar systems; and to incorporate consideration of solar energy 
systems in building and land us.e and development throughout New Jersey. 144 
The Master Plan emphasized that the Department would und-ertake a 
planning assistance program to work with municipal and zoning boards in 
drafting solar elements in the municipal master plans required by the Municipal 
Land Use Law, to review and formulate changes in the Uniform Construction 
Code, us to promote solar systems, to consider legislation guaranteeing sunlight 
access for solar users, and to encourage financial incentives to promote the 
use of solar systems. 146 Among the regulations adopted pursuant to this Plan 
was a joint regulation by the New Jersey Departments of Energy and 
Environmental Protection requiring all applicants for permits to build in the 
state's coastal area to demonstrate why passive and active solar designs were 
not applicable for the proposed project. 147 
In proposed amendments to the Energy Master Plan released for public 
hearings in 1981, the Department proposed that municipalities and county 
governments play much stronger roles in conserving energy and promoting 
solar energy through the land use planning process and municipal master 
plans. 148 In 1980, the legislature had already required that municipalities and 
county governments enact ordinances concerning site plans or subdivisions 
that would require that streets be oriented to permit buildings to maximize 
solar gain. 149 The Department outlined what a municipal energy master plan 
should include beyond street and building orientation and also called for in-
creasing densities near urban areas, employment centers, and transit lines to 
reduce trip lengths, wasteful infrastructure development and unnecessary energy 
transmission costs_ Further suggested local planning considerations included 
the following: solar envelope zoning; rezoning multi-family and attached hous-
ing; cluster development with mixed uses (residential, commercial and in-
dustrial); and discouragement of strip development, infill, non-contiguous 
development and wide streets. 15~ The Master Plan amendments expressly call 
----------------------------~-----------------------------·-
143. Id. at 32-38. 
144. Id. at 35-36. 
145. N,.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-119 to -151 (West Supp. 1984--1985). 
146. ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at 36. 
147. /d. at 42. 
148. See 1981 AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-24 to C-32. 
149. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-38(b)(2) (WeS,t Supp. 1984-1985); 1981 PRo-
POSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-25 to C-26. 
150. See 1981 PRoPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 125, at C-25 to C-31. Multi-
• 
• 
1984] SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 603 
for municipalities to locate new residential, industrial and commercial develop-
ment in older, developed areas. This makes use of the existing infrastructure 
and mass transit to reduce energy consumption in the transportation sector, 
which uses about forty-five percent of the petroleum consumed in the state.•s• 
New Jersey's municipalities face a legal dilemma. Given the express intent 
of the legislature that other agencies including municipalities in their zon-
ing adhere to the state Energy Master Plan • 52 and further legislation calling 
for zoning regulations and subdivision site plan ordinances to implement a 
solar and conservation construction strategy, 153 local governments should begin 
to reject builders' plans which do not at least call for street and house orienta-
tion to maximize solar utilization. Yet, in carrying out this responsibility, and 
in exercising legislatively delegated powers to actively encourage solar e~ergy 
use, after Mount Laurel II municipalities will subject themselves to suit for 
having added to the cost of housing, as though zoning for a solar future were 
an exclusionary device. 
To avoid this regressive result, the SDGP must be revised to fully incor-
porate the Energy Master Plan. Municipalities attempting to fulfill their Mount 
Laurel II obligation would then clearly have to consider the long-term cost 
effectiveness of solar energy. The Energy Master Plan could be incorporated 
into the SDGP when it is revised as part of its triennial update. Finally, Mount 
Laurel judges and the state supreme court must become aware of the great 
need and P.Otential for energy conservation and solar energy in new construc-
tion, the ease with which this goal could be accomplished or upset, and the 
need to retrofit our urban and developed suburban houses with solar systems, 
to the extent possible, to move toward an energy self-sufficient New Jersey. 
If the bench, bar and builders are educated about solar energy this goal will 
be realized in a way that includes the poor, who are currently excluded from 
the solar future because of the relatively high initial cost of solar systems. 154 
As seen in the next part of this Article, these high costs have been the result 
of unnecessary obstacles to solar energy use. 
C. Solar Energy Development: A Legacy of Barriers 
Unlike traditional sources of energy, some of which have received exten-
family and attached housing, for example, saves 30 to 600Jo of the heating and cooling 
requirements of a single family house. /d. at C-27. 
151. /d. at C-28. 
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27F-15 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-38 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
154. The relative cost of solar energy as compared to other fuels is distorted by 
the subsidization received by the more traditional energy sources. Price controls and 
other regulations keep the cost of oil, gas, coal and uranium far below their economic 
values. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note lll, at 225 ... 26. Thus, solar energy, which is prac-
tically unsubsidized, is placed at a competitive disadvantage. Recent state and federal 
enactments providing financial incentives to solar energy users have slightly reduced 
this price distortion. See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text. 
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sive federal government aid to stimulate growth, solar energy development 
in the United States has been stymied as a result of a variety of imposing 
barriers~ These barriers fall into three major categories: economic, institutional 
. . 
and legal. 
1. Economic Barriers 
The critical economic barrier to the development of solar energy is the 
perception by possible buyers of active solar heating, especially in retrofit situa-
tions, that the dollars spent on installing a system will not be recouped in 
future fuel savings. 1 ss This is a false perception: potential consumers fail to 
appreciate that their initially high solar investment will not only be recouped 
in future fuel savings, but the solar system will actually start earning money 
for its owners. That is, an active solar system's life cycle cost, consisting of 
installation and fuel expenses over the system's lifetime, is much less expen-
sive than the life cycle costs of traditionally fueled heating systems. 156 
The cost of borrowing money to pay for solar heating technology is another 
economic barrier. An individual will have to pay interest rates up to twenty 
percent higher to save a kilowatt through solar energy than to add a kilowatt 
of capacity through utilities. is? The installation of solar heating may also 
increase the value of a building with the consequence of increasing property 
taxes. 158 Solar users in New Jersey, however, will pay no sales or increased 
property taxes on solar systems until at least 1988.1 59' 
2. Institutional Barrie.rs 
Some problems are the result of misperceptions. Also, the lack of technical 
skills in installing and maintaining solar systems has created reliability problems 
in system performance,. This, in turn, may dissuade otherwise interested 
customers from installing solar equipment. 160 A substantial portion of the 
potential market for solar heating technology lacks basic understanding; of 
the effectiveness and operation of solar equipment. 161 Moreover, many poten-
tial consumers still perceive the use of solar technology as an elitist phenomenon 
due to its high price. 162 
Other problems are more institutional in nature. For instance, since solar 
heating systems usually require back -up heating systems, fueled by traditional 
fuels, cooperation with utilities is essential. Many utilities have seen solar 
155. ENERGY FuTURE, supra note 113, at 191-92. 
156. SoLAR LAW, supra note 120, at 3. 
157. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 113, at 193. 
158. /d. 
159. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 54:328-8.33 (West Supp. 1984-1985); see infra note 194. 
160. ENERGY FuTURE, supra note 113, at 194. 
161. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-2. 
162. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra, note 113, at 191. 
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heating as competing with their own role as producers and converters of energy. 
Other utilities view solar energy as a threat to their self-defined growth 
programs. 163 The utility rate structure may also deter solar use since it is usually 
based on average cost category use or on volume of usage, rewarding energy 
waste rather than conservation. 164 
Solar research has traditionally been given a small research and develop-
ment budget by both government and industry. Total federal funding for solar 
programs was less than $100,000 per year before 1972. 165 While federal solar 
funding increased in the late 1970's under President Carter, the Reagan 
Administration has reduced the already small solar and wind portion of the 
federal energy budget by sixty percent. 166 Yet for many years, traditional forms 
of energy have been substantially supported by direct and indirect subsidies 
such as the oil depletion allowance and massive government investment in 
nuclear energy research and development. If the federal government withdrew 
from these other traditional sectors of the energy business, or if solar energy 
were subsidized to the same degree as the traditionally subsidized sources of 
energy, solar energy could compete on a true cost basis in the energy 
marketplace. 167 
3. Legal Obstacles 
A variety of legal impediments have plagued the widespread use of solar 
heating technology in existing and new buildings. The most significant bar-
riers are municipal zoning laws and procedures which place limits on the loca-
tion and use of solar collectors, the materials of which they can be made, 
and the physical dimensions of the equipment. State and local building codes 
which create arbitrary engineering requirements regarding structural elements 
of solar equipment, inappropriate plumbing and heating performance stan-
dards, and capricious limitations on the integration of solar collectors into 
structures also impede the use of solar systems. 168 Other barriers include private 
covenants and easements which seek to limit the use of solar collectors in new 
or existing structures, denial of injunctive relief in support of continued uninter-
rupted access to sunlight for landowners with in-place solar collectors on their 
buildings, arbitrary state and federal tax regulations which tax solar systems 
as property improvements, tax the purchase of solar systems, and allow no 
income tax deduction or credit for purchase; and the uncertain legal status 
regarding the ability to convey solar air space rights by neighboring property 
owners. 169 
163. /d. at 195. 
164. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-2. 
165. See id. at G-3. 
166. SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 3. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. at 237. 
169. See id. 
• 
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D. Incentives for Solar Energy Development in New Jersey: 
Before Mount Laurel II 
1. General Financial and Use Incentives 
During the 1970's, federal legislation was passed to remove some of the 
previously discussed financial barriers which inhibit solar energy development 
in the United States. In three separate acts, Congress provided modest finan-
cial support for solar energy research and development, and modest tax breaks 
for individual$ who installed solar heating equipment on their principal 
residences. These were the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 
1974170 (providing limited funds for solar research and development), the 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978171 (designed to set standards 
and provide loans, audits and grants for energy conservation and buildings), 
and solar tax provisions of the Energy Tax Act of 1978172 (allowing a qualified 
renewable energy source expenditure credit and qualified energy conservation 
expenditure credit for an individual's principal residence). 
The New Jersey Legislature followed the federal lead by removing some 
of the financial barriers to the use of solar heating equipment on individual 
residences in the state. State tax legislation exempted active and passive solar 
systems from inclusion in the assessed value of real property for real estate 
taxation purposes, i 73 and another statute stipulated that qualified solar energy 
equipment is exempt from the state sales tax. 174 The state Solar Easement Act, 175 
passed in 1978, allows for the making and recording of solar airspace easements 
over another's land by describing vertical and horizontal angles from a solar 
collector or wall. 176 
While these state laws provided a promising start for incentives to sup-
port solar energy on a par with traditional energy sources, New Jersey has 
lagged behind other states' efforts to financially encourage the growth and 
expansion of solar energy. 171 The State Uniform Construction Code Act, 178 
170. Pub. L. No. 93-409, 88 Stat. 1069 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U .S.C. 
§§ 2473(b), 5501-5517 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 
171. Pub. L. No. 95-119, 92 Stat. 3282 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 8201-8278 (1982)). 
172. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3175 (1978) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 44C (1982)). 
173. N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 54:4-3.113 to -3.120 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
174. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.33 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
175. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3-24 to 3-26 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
176. At least one commentator has criticized the general format of New Jersey's 
solar easement law, which is patterned after Colorado's law, as being too restrictive 
in requiring precise vertical and horizontal angles. See SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 41. 
177. Other states have taken innovative actions to encourage solar energy use and 
development. See SoLAR ENERGY REsEARCH INSTITUTE, U.S. DEP'T oF ENERGY, 
A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES (1979). 
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-119 to -151 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
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statutory and case law that allows utility rate discrimination against users of 
solar energy systems needing traditional energy backup, • 79 and the lack of 
statutory life cycle cost approaches to public construction investment 
decisions 180 still financially impede reasonable solar energy use in New Jersey. 
2. Land Use Incentives 
The Municipal Land Use Law of 1975 181 theoretically provided a regulatory 
framework adaptable to the the joint state-local implementation of solar 
energy. 182 The legislation did not expressly encourage the use of solar energy 
and other alternative energy technology through land use planning techniques, 
however, and substantial questions exist about the legality of local solar land 
use policies. With the passage of the 1979 energy amendments to the Municipal 
Land Use Law, 183 the legislature expressly delegated power to local planning 
and zoning boards in New Jersey to implement land use policies to encourage 
solar energy and energy conservation. The legislature authorized local plan-
ning boards to "promote the conservation of energy through the use of plan-
ning practices designed to reduce energy consumption and to provide for max-
imum utilization of renewable energy sources.'' 184 
The legislature also authorized other local planning and zoning tools, such 
as energy conservation elements in master plans; •ss subdivision and site plan 
review ordinances which maximize solar gain to buildings by proper street 
orientation and requirements which serve to conserve non-renewable energy 
and use renewable energy sources, 186 and zoning ordinances which allow the 
regulation of the bulk, height, orientation, and size of buildings and require 
that buildings and structures use renewable energy sources, within limits of 
IJ 
practicability and feasibility in certain places. 187 Moreover, the governing bodies 
of New Jersey municipalities were admonished by the 1979 amendments to 
179. A rate structure that adversely impacts solar energy users may be difficult 
to challenge under current case law. Several cases_ arising under New Jersey public 
utility law have upheld the legality of rate structures that subsidize all-electric customers, 
despite antidiscrimination laws, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 48:3-1, -2, -4 (West 1969 
& Supp. 1984-1985). For example, in Rossi v. Garton, 88 N.J. Super. 233, 211 A.2d 
806 (App. Div. 1965), a New Jersey court held that an allowance of $150 to anyone 
installing electric home heating did not violate the state's antidiscrimination statute. 
The court interpreted the statute to bar only ''unjust'' discriminations and concluded 
that only arbitrary discriminations are unjust. /d. at 236, 211 A.2d at 808. 
180. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-9. 
181. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:550-1 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (amended in 
1979; additions to statute are underlined, deletions are crossed out). 
182. See ENERGY MASTER PLAN, supra note 122, at G-3. 
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 to -106 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
184. /d. § 40:55D-2(n). 
185. /d. § 40:55D-28(b)(9). 
186. /d. § 40:55D-38(b)(2); 40:55D-4l(e). 
187. ld~ § 40:55D-65(b). 
608 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:573 
periodically examine and prepare written reports with recommendations for 
improvement on the extent to which there had been significant changes in 
the assumptions, policies and objectives forming the basis for land use laws 
with particular regard to energy conservation. 188 
The 1979 energy amendments constituted a strong legislative policy state-
ment authorizing and encouraging bold and innovative local solar energy plan-
ning approaches which could reduce New Jersey's unwholesome dependence 
on petroleum fuels.' 89 Thus, prior to the supreme court's decision in Mount 
Laurel//, New Jersey municipalities had a wide variety of land use planning 
options to promote alternative energy within their borders. 190 These local solar 
land use options included traditional zoning tools to expand solar access and 
energy conservation such as low density zoning, new height, grade and set-
back rules, down zoning and overlays. A municipality could also write its own 
solar comprehensive plans that would make vigorous use of legislatively-
mandated energy conservation elements by providing such components as 
energy conservation provisions, required orientation of streets to take max .. 
imum advantage of direct rays of the sun, prevention of structures and vegeta .. 
tion from blocking sunlight to approved solar collectors, and mapping out 
188. /d. § 40:55D-89(c). 
189. According to the Energy Master Plan, supra note 122, New Jersey's total 
energy consumption by fuel type compares unfavorably to the Northeast region and 
the United States in general, as shown by the following table: 
New Jersey 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Coal 
Nuclear 
Northeast 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Coal 
Nuclear 
United States 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Coal 
Nuclear 
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL TYPE 
1960 1970 
69.80Jo 
12. SOJo 
17.1 OJo 
.OOJo 
54.80Jo 
14.00Jo 
28.90Jo 
.OOJo 
42.00'/o 
31.40Jo 
22.60Jo 
.Oo/o 
71.80Jo 
18. 70Jo 
7. 70Jo 
2.8o/o 
60.00Jo 
16.40Jo 
19.90Jo 
0.90Jo 
41.80'/o 
34.3o/o 
19.4o/o 
.30Jo 
1974 
76.5o/o 
16.70Jo 
4.60Jo 
2.3o/o 
61.10Jo 
15.40Jo 
17 .40Jo 
1.20Jo 
43.70Jo 
32.0o/o 
17. 90Jo 
I. 7o/o 
190. See generally Blomquist, The Case for Local Solar Land Use Ordinances, 
97 N.J. LAW. 39 (1981), reprinted in NEw JERSEY MuNICIPALITIES 40 (Nov. 1982) and 
10 CuRR. MuN. PRoss. 49 (Summer 1983). 
Local government officials could pick and choose from an assortment of solar 
energy land use tools which are appropriate for the unique demography and developmen-
tal characteristics of the community. Moreover, different planning approaches could 
be taken for varying neighborhoods within a single municipality. /d. 
• 
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areas of the municipality for special planned unit solar development polices. 
A municipality could pass subdivision regulations and site plan review 
ordinances which would provide for regulation of solar use and solar access. 
Another option was to enforce solar envelopes and bulk plane zoning that 
would provide a simple ''rectangular box envelope'' that could protect solar 
access on nearby lots by outlining the three dimensional areas in which building 
construction could take place on a particular lot. Zoning incentives for solar 
use are especially useful in particular building projects or planned unit 
developments where density bonuses could be awarded and transferrable solar 
development rights given to developers for buildings laid out for solar access. 
Under this latter technique, land ownership is severed into two categories per-
mitting transfer of the affirmative right to solar access of a specific piece of 
property to another site. 
Yet another option was to enforce ordinances that declare vegetation or 
structures that shade qualified solar collectors as constituting public nuisances. 
A municipality might also have mandated local energy impact statements which 
require analysis of the energy demand of a suggested development project and 
the local and regional sources of energy available to meet the demand, requir-
• 
ing that solar energy and conservation be utilized whenever practical. Finally, 
the municipality could provide a method for vesting solar collector rights 
through local recording. After the Mount Laurel II decision, however, the 
future of these practical and innovative solar energy planning techniques has 
been considerably darkened. 
E. New Jersey's Solar Energy Future: Possible Consequences of 
Mount Laurel II 
Mount Laurel II has threatened the future of solar energy development 
in New Jersey. Yet, because there are a number of policy actors that may 
react in different ways to the court's judicial mandates including the New 
Jersey Supreme Court itself the actual turn of events in the coming years 
is uncertain. 
First, due in large part to increased fiscal pressures, it is considerably doubt-
ful that New Jersey municipalities will undertake comprehensive solar plan-
ning and zoning after Mount Laurel//. The supreme court's decision adds yet 
another local governmental responsibility to a host of existing demands for 
scarce local tax dollars .. Moreover, unlike other theoretically or truly discre-
tionary municipal government services such as garbage collection, recreational 
programs and solar planning efforts, the Mount Laurel II mandate is a matter 
not of choice but of necessity. Indeed-, it is a matter of first order priority., 
Any effective local effort at solar planning will entail extra transaction costs 
to the municipality to pay for land use experts, attorneys and engineers to 
develop the plans and local officials to administer the plans once developed. 
The municipality will also bear opportunity costs as local dollars spent on 
solar development are dollars unavailable for other worthy purposes such as 
schools, libraries, road improvements and sewage treatment plants. Moreover, 
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land dedicated to solar energy construction is land unavailable for overzoned 
"least cost" housing. Thus, Mount Laurel II creates a strong local disincen-
tive against meaningful solar planning. Solar energy development was not a 
top local priority before Mount Laurel II; after the decision it is likely to 
be a luxury or worse, a dangerous oddity which might be viewed as an exclu-
sionary zoning device by potential litigants. 
Second, while sensible solar planning, building design, and site orienta-
tion do not necessarily add to new development costs, it is likely that con-
tinued uninformed opinion on the subject of solar construction and the 
pressures created by Mount Laurel Irs least cost approach will lead local 
officials to eschew required solar building standards in lower-income housing 
construction. Life-cycle approaches to construction costs reveal that use of 
solar energy results in significant net savings over traditional energy systems. 19 ' 
Likewise, reasonably high housing densities can be achieved in many areas 
without sacrificing solar access, provided the housing is carefully sited and 
oriented. 192 Without special local efforts to understand and incorporate these 
• 
technical needs and the willingness to pay for expertise in addressing them 
and educating developers, it is probable that local officials will avoid even 
the appearance of adding to the cost of a building intended for low- and 
moderate-income housing. 
Third, even if a municipality were interested in undertaking the additional 
costs and uncertainty of comprehensive solar planning after Mount Laurel 
II, restrictive judicial interpretation of local powers under the Municipal Land 
Use Law193 has reduced that municipality's ability to use flexible and innovative 
planning techniques to encourage solar heating use. For example, the New 
Jersey Superior Court undermined the prospect for utilizing solar transferable 
development rights recently in Centrex Homes of New Jersey, Inc. v. Mayor 
& Council of Township of East Windsor.l 94 There the trial court held that 
New Jersey municipalities lack authority to adopt transferable development 
right (TOR) programs under the Municipal Land Use Law. Thus, an act of 
the legislature is apparently necessary to expressly delegate such authority, 
as well as to spell out in detail precisely how TDRs are to be recorded, con-
veyed, taxed and treated generally. 195 While it is arguable that this interpreta-
tion would be inappropriate in the case of solar transferable development rights 
promulgated pursuant to the specific energy and solar planning powers 
191. SoLAR LAw, supra note 120, at 27-29; N. SHAW & J. BAUER, A NEw 
JERSEY AN's CoNsUMER GumE To SoLAR ENERGY SYsTEMs: WttH AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 
113-14 (1978). 
192. U.S. DEP,T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEY., PROTECTING SOLAR ACCESS FOR 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PLANNING OFFICIALS 41 (1979). 
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:550-1 to -99 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
194. No. L-06433-83 P.W. (Law Div. May 13, 1983), cited in Hluchan, Overview 
of Pinelands Preservation Plan, 104 N.J. LAW. 21, 25 n.42 (1983). 
195. Hluchan, Overview of Pinelands Preservation Plan, 104 N.J. LAW at 24. 
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delegated by the legislature to municipalities, 196 a municipality would face con-
siderable legal uncertainty if it attempted to implement such a solar planning 
technique in the face of the Centrex Homes decision. Finally, it would certainly 
be rational for New Jersey's municipalities to totally abdicate responsibility 
for energy policy in general, and solar ener.gy policy in particular, in the face 
of the mandate for centralized statewide regional planning enunciated by the 
Mount Laurel II court. 197 There is, after all, no requirement that municipalities 
actively encourage solar energy on the local level, only that they consider the 
energy impact of their master plans. Indeed, the legislative history of the energy 
amendments to the Municipal Land Use Law provides that municipalities, 
"facilitat[e] the issuance of variances if they can be reasonably justified on 
energy efficiency grounds, and promot[e] the exploitation of solar energy by 
providing for the appropriate orientation of streets, within the limits of prac-
ticability andfeasibility.'' 198 The Assembly Energy and Natural Resources Com-
mittee viewed the amendments as flexible. The Committee noted that local 
planning boards should incorporate energy conservation considerations into 
their master plans (1) only upon the periodic revision of such plans, that is, 
at least every six years, rather than immediately, and (2) only if such energy 
conservation criteria are found to be practicable andfeasible. 199 If municipalities 
perceive Mount Laurel II as . a policy sign-al that energy planning is now a 
responsibility of the state, we can expect to witness a continuation of the trend 
in centralized energy decision making with a bias toward traditional energy 
sources at the state level. 
. Furthermore, the Mount Laurel II decision contains no recognition of 
the Energy Master Plan and allows little room for the solar and conservation 
goals of the Pla.n to be implemented with respect to Mount Laurel-induced 
new housing construction. The goals of the Energy Master Plan may have 
been superseded by the supreme court's interpretation of the SDGP as con-
trolling where two or more master plans conflict. 200 These perceptions will 
significantly retard attempts by the legislative and executive branches and 
municipalities to pursue an energy efficient and solar future. 
196. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text. 
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
199. Assembly Energy and Natural Resources Comm. Statement, Assembly No. 
1551--L. 1980, c. 146, quoted after text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:550-2 (West Supp. 
1984~1985) (emphasis added). 
200. The supreme court's complete analysis of the central importance of the SDGP 
is contained Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 223-48, 456 A.2d at 427-35. While the court 
did not expressly indicate in its opinion that the SDGP would control over another 
state master plan, such as the ENERGY MASTER PLAN, this conclusion is justified by 
reasonable inferences drawn from the opinion. First, the court has indicated that the 
comprehensive plans for management and control of environmentally sensitive areas 
prepared by the Division of Coastal Resources, Bureau of Coastal Planning & Develop-
ment Department of Environmental Protection, and the Pinelands Commission would 
govern the fair share obligation ''to the extent that these plans permit or encourage 
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IV. Socio-EcoNOMIC AND PoLITICAL SECOND-ORDER 
CoNSEQUENCES OF Mount Laurel II 
One of the express purposes of Mount Laurel II is to foster social and 
racial egalitarianism and to help alleviate the ~'self-destructive division between 
affluent suburban are,as and depressed inner cities. " 201 Toward that end, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court sought to zone poor people into substantial areas 
of the state to reflect fundamental fairness and decency in the exercise of 
governmental police power, 202 since the state cannot favor the rich over the 
poor in controlling the use of land. 203 
Despite these goals, segregation along racial and economic grounds is likely 
to continue. Rather than being on an exclusively regional basis, however, racial 
and social segregation will resurface on an intra-municipal level within the 
various municipalities subject to the Mount Laurel obligation. Although the 
court expressly acknowledged that intra-municipal segregation will be accept-
able along economic lines, 204 and implicitly along racial lines, 205 it ignored 
growth.'' /d. at 227 n.It, 456 A.2d at 424 n.ll. By negative implication, therefore, 
the court would not recognize conflicting plans contained in another state master plan; 
such as the Energy Master Plan. Second, the primacy of the SDGP, in the face 
of other state master plans, is repeatedly mentioned in the course of the court's opinion. 
See, e.g., 92 N.J. at 228 n.l2, 236, 246-47, 352, 456 A.2d at 425, 429, 435, 490. Third, 
the court has interpreted the SDGP as having predominant authority over other state 
agency ''functional plans." /d. at 234-35, 456 A.2d at 428-29. But see id. at 239, 456 
A.2d at 431 (The court indicated that the SDGP will not be "the absolute determinant 
of the locus of the Mount Laurel obligation'' since parties will be allowed the oppor-
tunity uto persuade the trial court, in a particular case, that the SDGP should not 
determine whether the Mount Laurel doctrine applies to the particular municipality 
involved in the case."). 
201. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 416 n.5. 
202. ld. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415. 
203. /d. 
204. Id. at 259-60, 456 A.2d at 442. The court stated: 
[W]here fully developed municipalities are involved ... [t]he Mount Laurel 
doctrine should ordinarily be able to be accommodated, for example, without 
placing lowet income housing projects in the middle of long-settled middle 
or upper income sections of a town. 
• • • • 
The proportion between [low- and moderate ... income housing within a 
municipality will be] inevitably, a matter for expert testimony. It will depend 
as does the fair share [obligation] itself, on a complex mix of factors. 
/d. at 240 n.l5, 257, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5, 440. 
205. Blacks and Hispanics make up a substantial portion of the nation's poor 
people. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1-55 (1980). See 
also K. AuLETTA, THE UNDERCLAss 255-61 (1983). As noted by Auletta: 
Black Americans are three times as likely to be poor as whites, and Hispanics 
more than twice as likely. In the introduction to the National Urban League's 
Annual Assessment, The State of Black America 1980, Vernon Jordan, the 
• 
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the potential social costs of continued segregation. Without an assimilation 
of middle- and upper-income residents and lower-income residents in a par-
ticular municipality and housing interaction between the races, the prospect 
exists for discrimination in the provision of municipal services between dif~ 
ferent portions of a town, the creation of ethnic and class ghettoes and exacer-
bation of a ''rich versus poor'' mentality. Intra-school tensions between groups 
of children who may perceive themselves as different from one another in 
light of their obviously different housing patterns may not improve. 206 
Mount Laurel II also inequitably redistributes wealth from residents of 
growth areas, builders and upwardly-mobile homeowners to low-income 
households. Implementation of the court's decision will force redistribution 
of wealth from a few categories of individuals to lower-income households. 
Mandatory "set asides" by builders amount to an internal subsidy207 by 
developers of the regional poor. According to one critic, if a developer erected 
ten units, eight would rent or sell at a premium in order to subsidize the two 
units which would be rented or sold to low- and moderate-income individuals. 
To preclude a windfall profit, a set aside unit would not be freely transferable. 
It could only be sold to a similarly situated individual at a limited increment 
over the purchase price, such as the increase in the Consumer Price Index 
for the period during which the unit was owned. The fairness of this pro-
cedure is questionable. Builders and purchasers of new homes should not be 
responsible for subsidizing low-income housing. Society should pay for these 
costs as a general, rather than a special, obligation. 208 Small builders, in par-
ticular, will be unfairly penalized since mandatory set asides are not suitable 
for small projects. Moreover, disallowing an upwardly-mobile low- or moderate-
income family from realizing the reasonable increase in market value of their 
home when it is sold violates a basic aspect of owning property realizing 
a profit from appreciation of that property. Notwithstanding the initial sub-
sidization, Mount Laurel II will inhibit a family from moving to a larger, 
better home by realizing equity appreciation unless that new horne is also sub-
sidized. Finally, property owners in municipalities containing growth areas 
• 
league's president, wrote "Black income, which was over 60 percent of white 
income in 1969, fell to only 57 percent by the end of the decade. More blacks 
were poor at the end of the seventies than at the beginning. The black middle 
class, described as rapidly expanding by some so-called experts, actually 
declined from 12 percent to 9 percent of all black families during this period. 
. . . On balance . . . the seventies were not a time of progress within Black 
America." According to the National Puerto Rican Forum, the family income 
of Puerto Ricans dropped from 71 percent of the national average in 1959 
to 47 percent in 1979. 
/d. at 255. 
206. See generally STATE BAR MouNT LAUREL II REPORT, supra note 2. 
207. Bernstein, supra note ll 0, at 4. 
208. /d. 
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on the SDGP will be unfairly burdened by the Mount Laurel decision. They 
will have to absorb the substantial costs of subsidizing lower-income housing 
while homeowners in towns with little or no growth areas will not have to 
bear any burdens of the supreme court's decision to transfer wealth to lower-
income individuals and are likely to enjoy a windfall profit of appreciated 
property values. Beyond the aforementioned inequities and substantial disincen-
tives for actual construction, Mount Laurel II may threaten fair and efficient 
local control of housing prices209 and the availability of sufficient municipal 
operating funds to maintain the subsidized units in good repair. 
Mount Laurel II will result in inefficient planning decisions while discourag-
ing new jobs and industry. To force compliance with its doctrine and actually 
to induce the construction of lower-income housing, the court created some 
economically inefficient legal principles. The court's suggestion that 
municipalities help assure compliance through "overzoning" 210 for lower;.. 
income housing until such housing is actually built is the most blatant ineffi-
ciency. While overzoning may well achieve compliance, other important social 
and economic goals will be sacrificed or undermined in the process. Overzon-
ing, of course, implies displacement of other potential uses: schools, health 
facilities, industrial sites, parks, and other public and private uses. It is true 
that the bigger communities with relatively large tracts of undeveloped land, 
such as Mount Laurel Township, will bear less of an opportunity cost than 
geographically smaller communities, but both large and small communities-
will be denied the opportunity of making the most efficient use of their available 
land while they wait for ultimate compliance decisions from the courts. 
Mount Laurel II will also act as a disincentive for municipalities to under-
take aggressive campaigns to attract industry and business. This pernicious 
effect will, in turn, have a detrimental impact on employment opportunities 
for New Jersey residents. Municipalities' governing bodies will be unsure about 
what their obligations are under Mount Laurel// because an important criterion 
for a municipality's fair share is its present and future employment 
opportunities. 211 While the court probably defined fair share in this way to 
preclude overzoning for industry, its effect is to reduce industrial and 
office/research zoning, even where it is desirable. It would not be surprising 
if communities in non-growth areas were reducing or deleting their non-
residential zoning in order to preserve their status under the SDGP and to 
209. Municipalities have consistently had problems with administering analogous 
rent control ordinances. This has led to inequitable rentals placed on housing units 
by local rent control boards and, therefore; discouragement of housing opportunities 
within a locale. See generally C. BAIRD, RENT CoNTROL: THE HousiNG CRISIS_ U.S.A. 
35-39 (1971); D. MANDELKER, HOUSING SUBSIDIES JN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
19-20 (1973). 
210. See Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 262 n-.26, 456 A.2d at 453 n.26 (citing 
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 5l9, 371 A.2d 1192, 
1210-11 (1977)). 
211. 1d. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440. 
• 
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keep out of the growth category, while municipalities in the growth areas were 
restricting commercial and industrial zoning in order to limit their fair share 
obligation. This result will not be beneficial because businesses will not move 
from the suburbs to the cities, such as Newark, Trenton, or Camden, but 
will continue to decide between the Piscataways and Parsippany Troy-Hills 
of the state attractive suburban communities on major highways. 212 
Inefficiency in land use planning is institutionalized by Mount Laurel II. 
Despite the court's indication that a compliance order will have res judicata 
effect for six years, 213 the court created a wide and uncertain exception to 
this rule in a seemingly innocuous footnote. Indeed, the court warned that "a 
substantial transformation of the municipality may trigger a valid Mount Laurel 
claim before the six years have expired. " 214 This warning leaves the bench 
and bar wondering what "substantial transformation" means. This issue will 
only be settled by further litigation which, itself, creates substantial additional 
transactional and opportunity costs for municipal governments. 
In addition to the new Mount Laurel II responsibility imposed on growth 
area municipalities by the court, local governments must shoulder a considerable 
number of existing legal obligations imposed by the legislature and certain 
state administrative agencies. This is no more apparent than in the area of 
education, where local school districts are forced to provide a number of pro-
grams centrally mandated by the State Department of Education without 
adequate funding to carry out their responsibilities. 215 The court ignores the 
marginal effect of continued centrally prescribed municipal obligations without 
provision for adequate state funding to meet them. 
There is a notable lack of analysis by the court of the potential interstate 
effects of its decision. The court overlooked the palpable incentive that Mount 
Laurel II will give to poor families and individuals residing in other states 
to move into New Jersey's new lower-income housing, 216 and the concomi-
tant, though regrettable, prospect of midde- and higher-income families flee-
ing the state. New Jersey is already recognized as an entry point for a substan-
tial number of poor immigrants. 217 
212. See Bernstein, supra note 110, at 5. 
213.· Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 2,91-92, 456 A.2d at 458-59. 
214. /d. at 292 n.44, 456 A.2d 459 n.44. 
215. For example, New Jersey boards are continually required to carry out pro-
grams for which no funds are provided. See NJSBA 1983 LEGISLATIVE GoALs at 8. 
216. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 222 n.8, 456 A.2d 422 n.8. But see STATE 
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN, supra note 92, at 2-4, 6 (Department of Community Affairs' 
planners viewed the impact of the 1975 Mount Laurel I decision as minimal and did 
not incorporate lower-income housing projections into its future population projections). 
217. New Jersey, while being ninth in overall population nationwide, was sixth 
in the population of aliens reporting under the Alien Address Program in 1979, having 
269,000 or 5.30Jo of resident aliens nationwide. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1980 99 (Dec. 1980). See generally Ruebens, Aliens, Jobs and 
Immigration Policy, 51 Pus. INTER. 113 (1978) (discussing the detrimental impact on 
our labor market of legal resident aliens as well as illegal aliens). The national shortage 
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The supreme court notes that in non-growth areas such as limited growth, 
conservation, and agricultural areas, no municipality will have to provide for 
more than the present need generated within the .municipality, for to require 
more would be to induce growth in that municipality in conflict with the 
SDGP. 218 The proviso to this rule, however, is that if a municipality contain-
ing non-growth areas is found to have encouraged or allowed development, 
the SDGP "non-growth characterization" may be inappropriate. 219 The court 
apparently expects the numerous patchwork municipalities containing growth 
and agricultural or conservation areas to provide for an appropriate fair share 
of the region's low-income housing need. 220 
Application of the standard to some patchwork municipalities containing 
growth areas that are already fully developed, 221 but which consist substan-
tially of upper-income housing, will create a windfall fiscal benefit for the 
local governments relying on that tax base. In these municipalities, the prox-
imity of relatively expensive and exclusive housing to environmental amenities 
such as open space, farmland, and preserved natural areas will have a tendency 
to make the existing housing stock very valuable to prospective buyers in the 
middle and upper income levels. Accordingly, property values, assessed valua-
tions, and tax revenues will tend to rise because of the fortuitous operation 
of Mount Laurel II. Examples of such communities in Burlington County would 
include Evesham Township and Medford Township. 
Conversely, application of this standard to other patchwork municipalities 
containing growth areas that are substantially undeveloped will unfairly penalize 
these municipalities for undertaking reasonable and necessary encouragement 
of tax ratables such as industrial facilities and single family housing. While 
the supreme court has partially anticipated this problem by positing some vague 
hypothetical examples, 222 a municipality in this situation would face con-
in adequate housing for lower-income families is documented in DouGLAS REPORT, 
''BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY," H.R. 91~34, 9lst Cong .. , lst Sess. (1968): NATIONAL 
CoMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HousiNG, JoBs AND HousiNG 48 (1970). For a disc.us-
• 
sion of the regional inadequacies of such housing stock, see NEw JERSEY CouNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL Gov'T STUDY CoMM'N, HousiNG & SuBURBs: FISCAL & SociAL IMPACT oF 
MuLTIFAMILY DEv. (1974). See also Main, The Homeless of New York, 72 Pus. INTER. 
3 (1983) (estimated 36,000 homeless poor on the streets of New York City). See generally 
Palmieri, The Refugees: What Hfnfighting,'? 68 Pus. INTER. 88 (1982). 
218. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 244, 456 A.2d at 433-34. 
219. /d. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33. 
220. /d. at 243, 456 A.2d at 433. 
221. ld. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.15. 
222. The court gave the following hypothetical: 
If a municipality that is substantially rural changes only to the extent of an 
added industrial use and fairly large residential subdivision, that might or 
might not constitute a substantial change, depending on all of the cir-
cumstances; if in addition there was further development of its infrastructure 
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siderable uncertainty in formulating future zoning and tax plans. This uncer-
tainty is an inequitable fiscal burden since it involves extra municipal transac-
tional costs such as the need to hire more professional assistance in attempt-
ing to interpret the law, as well as incurring opportunity costs by being inhibited 
from vigorously seeking new industry and development needed to support the 
existing population. The burden falls randomly on some municipalities and 
not on others. 
The court's acknowledged buckpassing of difficult problems stemming 
from its decision in Mount Laurel II undermines its own judicial legitimacy. 
Critics of judicial activism accuse some courts of assuming an elitist posture 
that violates sovereignty and reaches deep into the lives of people against their 
will. 223 These critics contend that judicial activism in a democratic society tends 
to atrophy the sense of responsibility of both citizens and elected represen-
tatives in making fundamental political decisions. 224 In addition, since the 
judicial branch has a limited supply of political "capital" to draw upon, each 
time it tampers with policy supported by political majorities through interven-
tionism, the judiciary jeopardizes its own institutional power base. 225 
While the New Jersey Supreme Court enjoyed a relatively large balance 
. . . . 
of political capital when it decided Mount Laurel I; it has substantially depleted 
that capital over the ensuing years. In 1975, the Mount Laurel doctrine was 
new and promising. In spite of public opinion favoring zoning for fiscal goals, 
popular opposition to racial segregation and public support for equal housing 
opportunities by New Jersey citizens gave the court considerable leeway in 
judicial policymaking in this area. 226 The progeny of Mount Laurel I served 
to confuse and obfuscate municipal fair share obligations under the state 
constitution, 227 however, and realistically limited the political acceptability of 
the court's continued experimentation in exclusionary zoning cases. 
Mount Laurel II is dangerous because it seeks to borrow political capital 
and several new substantial places of work and residential subdivisions, that 
municipality's SDGP classification should probably be changed. 
ld. at 241-42, 456 A.2d at 432 (emphasis in original). 
223. See, e.g., Glazer, Towards An Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTER. 104, 106-07 
(1975), quoted in M. RESELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL PoLICYMAKING AND THE CouRTS 
6 (1982). 
224. /d. 
. . 
225. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PRocEss (1980); A. Coxt THE RoLE OF THE SuPitEME CoURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 
2 (1976); R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT (1960). 
226. STATE SuPREME CoURTS, supra note 3, at 67. 
227. After Mount Laurel I the supreme court decided several cases dealing with 
the Mount Laurel doctrine. See Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 
127, 450 A.2d 381 (1979); Fobe Assocs. v. Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977); 
Passack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Washington Township, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Oakwood 
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A .. 2d 1192 (1977). 
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by passing off some of the most troublesome problems presented by the rul-
ing onto other state officials and, ultimately, to the electorate. To illustrate, 
the court presents a fiscal fait accompli to the legislature, not unlike Robin-
son v. Cahill/ 28 which has "all but rewritten the state tax code" 229 for the 
second time in less than a decade. The court notes that inequitable tax and 
other burdens caused by the location of lower-income housing are the result 
of the state having made its decision on where development should occur . 
• 
If location in accordance with that state plan has adverse economic conse-
quences, the court found that it would be appropriate for the legislature rather 
than the court to correct them. 230 
This express avoidance of responsibility is especially dangerous because 
the court's premise that the legislative and executive branches mandated 
development according to the SDGP is questionable, and the court has con-
fronted the legislature in a time of long-term state fiscal austerity. 231 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has also abdicated responsibility for implementing several 
of the details of its decision. The court noted that ''the application of the 
Mount Laurel doctrine to fully developed municipalities will undoubtedly pose 
difficult problems,'' 232 but that a satisfactory resolution of the occasionally 
conflicting interests at times requires creativity and cooperation. 233 · 
The Mount Laurel ruling creates false hope for certainty and simplicity 
and will result in continued protracted litigation. The supreme court believes 
that its decision in Mount Laurel II will clarify the Mount Laurel doctrine 
and make it easier for public officials, including judges, to apply it, 234 while 
simplifying litigation in this area. 235 The court's view is unrealistic. The new 
Mount Laurel doctrine will continue to be enormously complex to administer 
and to interpret. Municipal officials attempting to understand the doctrine and 
trying in good faith to apply it to their towns, as well as judges who will 
be forced to grapple with its numerous principles, subtleties and exceptions, 
will face great uncertainty in dealing with future exclusionary zoning cases. 
Rather than employing one simple test for the determination of a 
municipality's obligation to provide low- and moderate-income housing, Mount 
Laurel II actually involves nine anticipatory standards. In turn, many of these 
standards are pregnant with alternative sub-standards and unresolved sub-issues. 
228. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). 
229. STATE SuPREME CouRTs, supra note 3, at 8. 
230. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 239, 456 A.2d at 431. 
231. Despite a short-term budget surplus in 1984, the State has been faced with 
periodic reports of revenue shrinkage and concomitant proposals for spending cuts. 
See, e.g., Task Force Recommends $500,000,000 Cut in School Aid, VII School Board 
Notes (New Jersey School Boards Association), Oct. 13, 1983, at I, col. 2. 
232. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5. 
233. /d. 
234. See id. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410. 
235. /d. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418. 
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A. Indigenous Poor Obligation Standard 
All municipalities in the state, no matter what their planning designation 
on the SDGP, "must provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for 
its indigenous poor except where they represent a disproportionately large seg-
ment of the population as compared with the rest of the region." 236 Questions 
• 
exist about what will constitute "decent housing" in the court's view, what 
would constitute ''a disproportionately large segment of the population'' suf-
ficient to absolve the obligation, and how these factors should be balanced. 
B. Total Growth District/Full Fair Share Standard 
In those municipalities of the state entirely made up of growth area designa-
tions, which are not "fully developed" communities, 237 and where no special 
proofs are proffered to show cause for deviation from the SDGP, Mount Laurel 
II requires an unequivocal obligation to provide what can be termed a "full 
fair share" of the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing. In 
other words, these municipalities' fair share calculations would be based on 
consideration of the total land area and total existing population of the 
municipality. 
C. Partial Growth District Standard 
By virtue of the SDGP's creation of several patchwork municipalities where 
growth areas are combined with other non-growth classifications, such as 
limited growth, conservation and agriculture, a "partial fair share'' obliga-
tion will exist in some locales. 238 In computing the Mount Laurel II quan-
236. /d. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418. 
237. /d. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5. 
238. As noted by the court: 
The existence of a municipal obligation to provide a realistic opportunity 
for a fair share of the region's present and prospective low and moderate 
income housing need will no longer be determined by whether or not a 
municipality is "developing." The obligation extends, instead, to every 
municipality, any portion of which is designated by the State, through the 
SDGP, as a "growth area." This obligation, imposed as a remedial measure, 
does not extend to those areas where the SDGP discourages growth namely, 
open spaces, rural areas, prime farmland, conservation areas, limited growth 
areas, parts of the Pinelands and certain Coastal Zone areas., ... Moreover, 
the fact that a municipality is fully developed does not eliminate this [the 
Mount Laurel II] obligation although, obviously, it may affect the extent of 
the obligation and the timing of its satisfaction. The remedial obligation of 
municipalities that consist of both "growth areas" and other areas may be 
reduced, based on many factors, as compared to a municipality completely 
within a "growth area." 
Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418. See generally id. at 354-74, 456 A.2d at 491-50 (the Appendix • 
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titative housing obligation in these communities, only land area and popula-
tion that is within a growth area on the SDGP will likely be considered. In 
these patchwork municipalities, the deviation from what would otherwise be 
a ''full fair share'' obligation, that is, assuming the municipality was made 
up entirely of growth areas on the SDGP, will vary depending upon the ratio 
of growth area land to non-growth area land. 
D. Total Growth District/Fully Developed Community Standard 
Municipalities subject to this standard will have their entire land area 
designated as a growth area on the SDGP, but will be fully developed. The 
court makes an exception from both the total growth district standard and 
the partial growth district standard for fully developed municipalities. 239 The 
language establishing this exception is ambiguous since it is not clear what 
,is quantitatively involved in exercising ''great care ... to assure that the benefit 
of Mount Laurel II is not offset by damage to legitimate zoning and planning 
objectives" 240 or resolving "occasionally conflicting interests [with] creativity 
and cooperation. " 241 This test is further confused by the court's rejection of 
the former Mount Laurel I developing/non-developing distinction242 for deter-
mining a municipality's regional fair share lower-income housing obligation 
on the one hand, followed by substantially the same standard when consider-
ing the quantitative numbers and locations of lower-income housing within 
a particular municipality. · 
E. Partial Growth District/Fully Developed Community Standard 
Municipalities subject to this standard will be fully developed patchwork 
municipalities which are made up of varying combinations of growth areas 
and non-growth areas. 243 
F. Rebutted SDGP Standard 
While subject to a heavy burden of proof, any party to a future Mount 
Laurel lawsuit can theoretically challenge the SDGP's classification for a defen-
dant municipality by providing expert testimony on why the SDGP designa-
tion was inappropriate or has become inappropriate. 244 Considerable further 
litigation will no doubt be required to determine what kind of expert testimony 
would be relevant or persuasive. 
contains the SDGP "concept maps," which show numerous municipalities that are 
in the nature of "patchwork" areas containing both growth and non-growth areas). 
239. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 240, 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431, 431 n.15. 
240. ld. at 240 n.l5, 456 A.2d at 431 n.l5. 
241. /d. 
242. /d. at 223-25, 456 A.2d at 422-23. 
243. See supra note 238. 
244. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 239-40, 456 A.2d at 431. 
• 
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G. Pinelands/Coastal Zone Standards 
The supre,me court noted that trial judges in Mount Laurel cases involv-
ing municipalities regulated by either the Pinelands Commission or the Divi-
sion of Coastal Resources of the state Department of Environmental Protec-
tion must consider in detail the classification system involved to determine 
whether imposition of the Mount Laurel doctrine would be consistent with 
the regional planning goals of the agencies, and whether the constitutional 
obligation will under any circumstances override those goals. 245 The pertinent 
Mount Laurel obligation of a municipality located in the Pinelands or the 
coastal zone will be subject to a case-by-case determination. The factors to 
be considered by the trial courts, however, are not specified. The court also 
appeared to mandate a more complex analysis in these environmentally sen-
sitive cases by virtue of the more detailed and ambiguous regional types of 
land specified in the coastal zone (high growth, moderate growth, low growth, 
barrier island) and the Pinelands (protection and preservation areas). By vir-
tue of the supreme court's follow-up decision in In re Egg Harbor Associates, 246 
environmentally sensitive areas of the state are also subject to an agency's 
imposition of an independently determined Mount Laurel obligation, subject 
to judicial override. 
H. Judicial Wildcard Standard 
The court left open the possibility that its elaborate Mount Laurel II stan-
dards will be subject to outright change or further revision or refinement. 247 
In this regard, the court specifically noted that flexibility is needed since the 
court's work is partially legislative in character. 24 s The possible meaning of 
this caveat is limited only by the imagination of counsel. Almost any socio-
economic argument would seem to be pertinent. 
/., SDGP Wildcard Standard 
In a footnote to its opinion, the court set forth a fallback position in 
the event that the State takes action rendering the use of the SDGP inap-
propriate for Mount Laurel purposes. 249 This could entail a failure by the 
Department of Community Affairs to update periodically the SDGP, legislative 
245. /d. at 245-46, 456 Aw2d at 434-35. 
246. 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115 (1983). In this case the court held that the Coastal 
Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1983), authorized 
the state Department of Environmental Protection to condition approval of a proposed 
development within the coastal zone on construction of "fair share" of low- and 
moderate-income housing units. But see Crema v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
94 N.J. 286, 463 A.2d 910 (1983). 
247. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 243, 456 A.2d at 433. 
248. !d. 
249. !d. at 248 n.21, 456 A.2d at 435-36 n.21. 
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action overruling the court's use of the SDGP for Mount Laurel purposes 
or continued unenforceable regional development standards. In the event that 
the SDGP becomes inappropriate, a modified developing municipality Mount 
Laurel I test will be imposed. This test is confusing at best. 250 
v. SOME LESSONS: MINIMIZING SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES 
OF INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 
Innovative policymaking by state and federal courts is no longer new or 
shocking. Despite continued debate by those who would limit the power of 
courts to hear certain types of controversial cases, 251 the two decade-long trend 
of active judicial involvement in a wide assortment of public law252 policy 
matters; including education, mental health, prison systems, land use regula-
tion, environmental protection and energy promotion, will probably continue 
unabated. As society becomes more complex, continued public law /institu-
tional litigation will be the norm rather than the exception. 
Indeed, for several decades_, state supreme courts have had significant 
effects \vithin the states and on the nation as a whole253 in the areas of 
elaborative policymaking (extension of precedent enunciated by the United 
States Supteme Court), 254 restrictive policymaking (limitations or evasion of 
policy developed by the United States Supreme Court), 255 institutio-nal 
policymaking (judicial activity directed toward preserving the autonomy and 
250. /d. The court held that: 
[D]eveloped municipalities shall be subje·ct to the Mount Laurel obligation 
- that includes the central cities and the built-up suburbs. The most signifi-
cant question in such cases will ordinarily be whether there is any land available 
for development, and, if not, what kind of remedy is appropriate to assure 
that as land becomes available, a realistic opportunity exists for the construc-
tion of lower-income housing, assuming it is otherwise suitable for that purpose. 
In addition to urban areas and the built-up suburbs, "developing" 
municipalities will be subject to Mount Laurel. To the extent that prior deci-
sions imply that the so-called "six criteria" must be satisfied to characterize 
a municipality as "developing" ... we disavow that implication. Any com-
bination of factors demonstrating that the municipality is in the process of 
significant commercial, industrial or residential growth or is encouraging such 
growth, or is in the path of inevitable future commercial, industrial or residen-
tial growth will suffice. 
/d. (emphasis in original). 
251. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JuDICIARY, Glazer, Should Judges 
Administer Social Services?, 50 Pus. INTER. 64 (1978); Glazer, Towards An Imperial 
Judiciary?, 41 Pus. INTER. 104 (1975). 
252. This paradigm was largely developed by Professor Abram Chayes in his article 
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). 
253. STATE SUPREME COURTS, supra note 3, at xi. 
254. /d. at xviii. 
255. /d. 
• 
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integrity of tl)e judicial process); 2 s6 and complementary policymaking (rulings 
that aid state legislative goals). 257 In light of the noticeable trend of retrench-
ment of federal court involvement in matters of arguable concern to the states, 
occasioned by the Supreme Court's "new federalism," and the active 
encouragement by some members of the United States Supreme Court of state 
supreme courts' expansion of their policymaking roles, opportunities for state 
supreme court policymaking in general, and innovative policymaking in 
particular, 258 will increase in the remaining years of this century. 259 
The central issue, then, is not a question of judicial legitimacy, that is, 
whether state supreme court innovative policymaking in public law/institu-
tional litigation is in keeping with the judiciary's proper role in the American 
political system, although poor innovative policymaking can contribute to 
public dissatisfaction with judicial power. Rather, as exemplified by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mount Laurel II, the critical issue is one 
of judicial capacity: legitimacy aside, can the judiciary capably handle the 
new responsibilities it has assumed? 
When embarking on innovative policy decisions in the future, state supreme 
courts should be more concerned about crafting effective and targeted rul-
ings, rather than justifying their power to make the rulings. In particular, 
since innovative policy decisions have far-ranging second-order consequences 
that are not readily detected or understood, state supreme courts should con-
centrate on minimizing these unintended consequences. In short, state supreme 
courts must strive to become first rate anticipatory and prophylactic govern-
mental institutions. They cannot be contented with merely emulating equal-
ling legislative oversight committees, for instance, or executive agency plan-
ning staffs. Because of the modern scope and importance of their decisions, 
state supreme courts must become preeminent social planners. 
Supreme courts should canvass diverse policy perspectives prior to mak-
. 
ing remedial innovative decisions. This could be achieved by liberalizing stand-
ing requirements at the remedy phase of trial, active court solicitation of amicus 
briefs from representative interest groups, and appointment of absentee 
advocates260 for interests not before the court. Before handing down an 
innovative policy decision, state supreme courts should formulate, with the 
assistance of court appointed experts and staff experts, judicial impact 
statements to avoid unintentional consequences of the decision in chief. 261 The 
burden should be on the winning party in institutional litigation to put for-
256. /d. 
257. /d. at xvii. 
258. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
259. STATE SUPREME COURTS, supra note 3, at xii. 
260. Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 
78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 870-927 (1978). 
261. B. LEVIN, THE COURTS AS EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKERS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS 92-93 (1977). 
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ward every plausible alternative remedy that might be consistent with the state 
supreme court's decision on the legal issues together with assessments of pro-
jected consequences and costs. The losing party,s adversary presentation could 
then assume a more useful form, and the court could· more easily weigh alter-
natives and probable costs against probable benefits. 2(; 2 
The issue of remedy should be considered a mixed factual and legal ques-
tion, not just a purely legal question. This has presented problems in the past 
where the evidence closes before the court's decision on the rights of the par-
ties, and usually does not reopen thereafter. Since the decision on the remedy 
entails a forecast of b-ehavior, it presents factual as well as legal questions, 
though, to be sure, these are questions about the future rather than about 
the past. That the remedy presents questions about the future is all the more 
reason to regard the facts as problematic rather than settled. 263 Supreme courts 
should engage in a two~step decisional process: one, a substantive law deci-
sion preceded with full briefing and oral argument by the parties; the second, 
a remedial decision preceded by written and oral input by the parties as well 
as by court appointed experts, staff, and those groups or institutions that 
will likely be affected by the decision. 
State supreme courts should also retain special confidential experts to assist 
them in gauging second-order consequences on an ongoing basis. These experts 
would be trained in policy science, future studies, operations research and 
systems analysis. Their reports would be confidential, subject to discretionary 
release by the court to certain individuals and institutions for feedback and 
input. 
State supreme courts should set a separate oversight calendar of their major 
innovative policy decisions, with a committee of two or three justices assigned 
to review, on a periodic basis, the remedial progress in particular cases as 
well as the evolving second-order consequences in a particular area. On recom-
mendation by the supreme court's oversight committee, the supreme court 
en bane could, on its own motion, bring a previously decided case back for 
review and adjustment, with a particular eye directed at clarifying and 
eliminating unintended second-order consequences of the decision. Supreme 
courts might even find it advisable to issue perio.dic policy progress reports 
which could be circulated among interested individuals and be subjected to 
regular feedback. 
State inter-branch policy review committees consisting of state supreme 
court justices, legislators, executive cabinet representatives, gubernatorial aides, 
and supporting staff could be established within states. These committees would 
meet on an annual or semi-annual basis and review second-order consequences 
of judicial decisions, as well as second-order consequences of legislation and 
administrative regulations and policy. From the perspective of state supreme 
262. CoURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 6, at 288~ 
263. Id. at 288-89. 
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courts, this type of cross-fertilization would assist the courts in understanding 
the full range of impact of their decisions. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount Laurel II decision is a classic 
example of innovative policymaking by a state supreme court. The decision, 
while admirable in its goals and social purposes, presents the prospect for 
troublesome second-order consequences in a number of policy areas, including 
discouraging local land use measures designed to encourage solar energy 
planning and construction, especially in new homes. 
Since innovative judicial policymaking by state supreme courts is likely 
to continue in scope and frequency in the future, state supreme courts should 
focus greater attention on anticipating and preventing unintended second-order 
consequences _of their decisions. A number of options are available; however, 
all options suggest reformulation of the remedial stage of institutional litiga-
tion to allow a wider variety of input by non-parties, expert assistance in gaug-
ing potential impacts, and periodic follow-up by state supreme courts of their 
major policy decisions. 
